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Abstract
The lowest level of government in sub-Saharan Africa is often a cadre of chiefs who raise
taxes, control the judicial system and allocate the most important scarce resource—land. Chiefs,
empowered by colonial indirect rule, are often accused of using their power despotically and in-
hibiting rural development. Yet others view them as traditional representatives of rural people,
and survey evidence suggests that they maintain widespread support. We use the colonial
history of Sierra Leone to investigate the relationships between chiefs’ power on economic de-
velopment, peoples’ attitudes and social capital. There, a chief must come from one of the
ruling families recognized by British colonial authorities. Chiefs face less competition and fewer
political constraints in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families. We show that places with fewer
ruling families have significantly worse development outcomes today—in particular, lower rates
of educational attainment, child health, and non-agricultural employment. But the institutions
of chiefs’ authority are also highly respected among villagers, and their chiefdoms have higher
levels of “social capital,” for example, greater popular participation in a variety of “civil society”
organizations and forums that might be used to hold chiefs accountable. We argue that these
results are difficult to reconcile with the standard principle-agent approach to politics and in-
stead reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs. Rather than acting as a vehicle
for disciplining chiefs, these organizations have been structured by chiefs to control society.
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1 Introduction
The social science literature on African development has identified the weakness of institutional
constraints prohibiting the abuse of state power as a potent cause of poor governance and low
growth in Africa (for example Bates, 1981, Sandbrook, 1985, Bayart, 1993, Young, 1994, Herbst,
2000, and the essays in Ndulu, O’Connell, Bates, Collier, Soludo eds., 2007). On a predominantly
rural continent, where the reach of the central state is often short, a lack of accountability at
the local level may be just as important. The lowest layer of government in most sub-Saharan
African (henceforth African) countries is occupied by chiefs, whose areas of administration are
essential to economic life. Chiefs raise taxes, control the judicial system, and allocate land, the
most important resource in rural areas.1 Despite their central role in the politics of Africa,
however, relatively little is known about how chiefs exercise their political and economic power,
how (and whether) they are accountable to their communities, and the effects of institutional
constraints on their power for development.2
A natural approach to the study of the role of chiefs would be to build on the influen-
tial principal-agent analysis of politics (e.g., Barro, 1973, Ferejohn, 1982, Persson, Roland and
Tabellini, 1997, Besley, 2007), which has been successfully applied at both the national and lo-
cal levels in other contexts. In our context, this perspective would suggest that the community
delegates power to chiefs and holds them accountable via a variety of mechanisms, including
threats of replacement and various forms of community participation in politics. Out of this
perspective would also follow a “chiefs as representatives” view of chiefs, which portrays them
as responsive to local demands and needs, and is supported by some evidence from the African
context. Logan (2009, 2011), for instance, shows that traditional authorities enjoy considerable
support from their people. In the AFRObarometer surveys she studies, 58% of respondents agree
that “the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should
increase”. Only 8% felt it should decrease. 61% of respondents report considerable trust in tra-
1Logan (2011) illustrates this power of chiefs using AFRObarometer survey from Benin, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Despite many of these countries having introduced elected
local governments, 50% of respondents report that traditional leaders have “some” or “a great deal” of influence
in governing their local community. Traditional authorities are often the primary institution regulating matters
of importance for local economic growth, raising taxes, mediating disputes and allocating land. They also have
influence over many categories of expenditures on local public goods such as schools and the maintenance of
infrastructure. In Ghana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Zambia and Mali, more than 30% of respondents report
that traditional leaders have the primary responsibility for allocating land. In Lesotho, Botswana, Ghana, Malawi,
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mali, Zambia, and Senegal, more than 30% of respondents report that traditional leaders have
the primary responsibility for resolving local conflict.
2Two important exceptions are Goldstein and Udry (2008) and Lange (2009), which we discuss at the end of
the Introduction.
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ditional leaders, whereas only 51% report such trust in local government officials. Results are
similar for perceived corruption. Across Africa, traditional leaders are broadly viewed as more
trustworthy and less corrupt than other institutions at the local level.3 These broader results
resonate with the case study literature from Sierra Leone (Fanthorpe 2001, 2005, Sawyer, 2008).
Extensions of this approach would suggest that where social capital is greater, accountability
promoted by community participation in politics would be higher (for example Nannicini, Stella,
Tabellini and Troiano, 2012).
Yet the fact that chiefs retain support from their communities is not direct evidence that
they are accountable to their communities. Chiefs in Africa are not typically elected along
the lines portrayed in the principal-agent literature and many, such as in Sierra Leone, come
to power today via relatively undemocratic selection methods. That they may therefore lack
accountability resonates with a different literature that portrays “chiefs as despots” who use
their power for personal gain, stifling rural economic development (e.g., Ashton, 1947, Hill,
1963, and Crowder and Ikime, 1970, Migdal, 1988, Berry, 1993, and Mamdani, 1996).4 In Sierra
Leone, predatory behavior by the chiefs is deemed so severe that it is argued to have been a
major cause of the civil war that erupted in 1991 (e.g., Richards, 1996).
These two strains of the literature, and their empirical underpinnings, are difficult to rec-
oncile. If chiefs are unaccountable and despotic, how do they maintain such strong popular
support? In this paper, we exploit the history of chieftaincy in Sierra Leone to study the impact
of chiefs and their powers on economic outcomes, peoples’ attitudes and social capital. Our
first results suggest that chiefs do act as despots. Though it is true that chiefs are not elected
along the lines formalized in the principal-agent literature, there are still important elements of
competition in the way they are selected. When chiefs are unconstrained by a form of political
competition arising from the presence of multiple ruling families (which are akin to political par-
ties) in a chiefdom, economic and developmental outcomes are worse. However, in line with the
chiefs as representatives view described above, relatively unconstrained chiefs also enjoy greater
respect of their constituencies, and their constituencies exhibit greater social capital and civic
participation. This somewhat puzzling result, we suggest, arises because more dominant chiefs
3Baldwin (2011) argues that such trust in chiefs implies they can be used as a means for vote mobilization
by national political parties. This is surely the case in Sierra Leone, where in 2011, in anticipation of the 2012
presidential election, the ruling All People’s Congress party feted the Paramount Chiefs with a celebration in Bo
town, presenting them each with new golden staffs of office.
4The influence of the chieftaincy certainly changed after independence, in some places being formally abolished
(for instance in Tanzania, Hyden, 1980, Osafo-Kwaako, 2011), and in others having its powers weakened and
authority challenged (Rathbone, 2000, on Ghana). Nevertheless, the structure of the institution shaped by
colonial policy has to a large extent persisted, and “traditional authorities” hold much authority over Africa’s
rural population today (see the essays in Crowder and Ikime, 1970).
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have been better able to mold the “civil society” and the institutions of civic participation in
their villages for their own benefit and continued dominance. Our results suggest both that the
principal-agent approach to governance, and standard assumptions about the positive relation-
ship between social capital, accountability and development outcomes may not be appropriate
in the African context.
In Sierra Leone, British colonialism transformed society in 1896 by empowering a set of
paramount chiefs as the sole authority of local government in the newly created Sierra Leone
Protectorate. The paramount chiefs and the chiefs under them remained effectively the only
institution of local government until the World Bank sponsored creation of a system of local
councils in 2004. These paramount chiefs are elected for life by a Tribal Authority made up of
local notables. Only individuals from the designated “ruling families” of a chieftaincy — the
elite created and given exclusive right to rule by the British at the initiation of the system in
1896 — are eligible to become paramount chiefs.
The number of ruling families is a natural constraint on the ability of the paramount chief to
exploit the power of the chieftaincy. The rents associated with the office are high, and when it
becomes vacant, competition between families is fierce. As Murphy (1990, p. 29) describes in his
study of the Mende of southern Sierra Leone, in the years leading up to a chief’s death families
form complex alliances with one another in order to secure votes from the Tribal Authority in the
upcoming election. Gaining support at all levels of local politics, from the paramount chief to the
village headman, “necessitates forming complex coalitions. Competitive agnates [descendants
from the same male line] ally with members of rival lineages at the same political level or with
lineages at higher or lower levels to gain support for their intralineage power struggles.” With
more ruling families, the set of potential coalitions a family can form to oppose another family
is greater, implying that a successful candidate in a chiefdom with more families must satisfy
a greater plurality of interests in order to be elected. In such chiefdoms, it should then be
more difficult for one family to use the chieftaincy extractively, to satisfy only its own narrow
preferences.5 Even if one family is able to dominate the chieftaincy for many generations, an
increased number of families implies a greater potential for the family to lose the paramount
chieftaincy in an election. This creates a potent (though often off-equilibrium path) threat that
will discipline paramount chiefs, forcing them to govern better.
5Conversely, with only a few ruling families, local politics is much more easily captured. We saw directly
the value of this capture during the the election for a new Paramount Chief in Sogbini chieftaincy which we
attended in December 2009. The Bio family, which had ruled the chieftaincy since 1896, was displaced by the
Bayo family, the only other ruling family. The announcement of the result created a great deal of elation, and
when we asked a member of the family of the newly elected chief what they would get out of this election, they
replied: “everything”.
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We argue, using historical case study and regression evidence, that the number of ruling
families in a chieftaincy was determined largely by historical factors unrelated to the deter-
minants of economic and political outcomes today, providing an attractive source of variation
in the investigation of the long-run effects of constraints on the abuse of power in the institu-
tion. In Section 2.3 and the Appendix we study the history of the ruling families in a sample
of chieftaincies, documenting that their origins are highly heterogenous and often the result
of historical accident, such as the availability of a male heir, or the number of leaders in an
invading war party. We also show that the number of ruling families is uncorrelated with the
level of development before the creation of paramount chiefs as measured by tax assessments
per chieftaincy of the British colonial government in the late 1890s. It is also uncorrelated with
a variety of other variables that might impact subsequent development, including distance to
navigable rivers, distance to the railway and minimum distance to major towns.
To measure the number of families, we conducted a survey in 2011 of “encyclopedias” (the
name given in Sierra Leone to elders who preserve the oral history of the chieftaincy) and the
elders in all of the ruling families of all 149 chieftaincies.6 While the government maintains
no official list of families, there is agreement within chiefdoms about the identity and number
of families. We used the survey to re-construct the history of the chieftaincy for as far back
as our respondents could recall. This history included the names of the paramount chiefs,
which ruling family they were from, and, when available, the dates they were elected. We also
collected information on the origins of the chieftaincy and of each of the ruling families. We used
(the unfortunately highly incomplete) archives of the Sierra Leone National Archive situated at
Fourah Bay College, as well as Provincial Secretary archives in Kenema, the National Archives
in London and available secondary sources to cross-check the results of our survey whenever
possible. We are the first to our knowledge to have constructed a comprehensive history of the
chieftaincy in Sierra Leone. A companion article, available online, Reed and Robinson (2012)
details the history of each of the 149 chieftaincies as best as possible using our survey data and
available secondary sources.
Our first set of empirical results, which focus on educational, health and economic outcomes,
are in line with the chiefs as despots view: there is a significant positive relationship between
the number of families on the one hand, and human capital outcomes, such as literacy and
educational attainment, and also the proportion of people working outside agriculture, which
is a useful proxy for the economic development (since there are no micro data on incomes
6We thank Mohammed C. Bah, Alimamy Bangura, Alieu K. Bangura, Mohammed Bangura, Shaka Kamara,
Solomon Kamara, Bai Santigie Kanu, Salieu Mansaray, Michael Sevalie, Alusine M. Tarawalie, and David J.
Walters for their diligence and dedication in helping collect these data.
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in Sierra Leone and more people tend to work outside agriculture in more prosperous areas).
Quantitatively, the effects are substantial. Moving from 1.8 ruling families to 7.7, from the
bottom quartile to the top, would increase literacy, primary and secondary school attainment
by 7 percentage points and non-agricultural employment by 3 percentage points, in all cases
from relatively low bases (for instance 32% and 7% for literacy and non-agricultural employment
respectively). We also find substantial positive effects of the number of ruling families on various
measures of child health and certain proxies for asset ownership.
However, we also find that places with fewer ruling families have more favorable attitudes
towards institutions of the paramount chief’s authority. In addition, we find that many measures
of social capital, such as attendance of community meetings, participation in social groups and
the undertaking of collective actions, are also higher in places with fewer ruling families. This
juxtaposition of results is a clear challenge to both the “chiefs as representatives” and “chiefs
as despots” views in African politics. Less constrained chiefs, who are associated with worse
outcomes, are viewed more favorably by their people, people who themselves have more social
capital. More generally these results are a challenge to the standard principal-agent approach
and to the literature on the political role of social capital, which argues that social capital
manifesting itself in political participation by the citizens is crucial for good governance (e.g.,
Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, Bowles and Gintis, 2002).7
We argue that these correlations can be explained by the fact that the political economy
of rural Africa deviates in important ways from that of developed countries. Political or social
institutions, such as community meetings, that look like they may further accountability in the
principal-agent literature function differently in many weakly-institutionalized polities. Indeed,
they do not function to control politicians but are structured by them to further their power
and their own control over society. In this, chiefs are the local equivalent of the “personal rule”
at the national level defined by Jackson and Rosberg (1982, pp.17-19) as
“a system of relations linking rulers ... with patrons, clients, supporters, and rivals,
who constitute the ‘system’.... The system is ‘structured’ ... not by institutions, but
by the politicians themselves.”
Consistent with this pattern, paramount chiefs facing limited competition do indeed act despot-
ically, but they are able to do so in part because they use non-governmental organizations as
7One possible argument would be that civil society may endogenously become stronger as a barrier against the
despotic power of chiefs in places with a few ruling families but despotic chiefs still stifle economic development
despite this stronger civil society. This argument, however, is consistent neither with the evidence that, when
there are only a few ruling families, attitudes towards chiefs are more favorable nor with the anthropological
evidence presented below, for example, and Murphy (1990) and Ferme (2001).
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a way of building and mobilizing support. Put differently, relatively high measures of civic
participation in villages with powerful paramount chiefs is not a sign of a vibrant civil society
disciplining politicians, but of a dysfunctional civil society captured by the paramount chiefs.8
Our results also help explain why many people have positive attitudes towards the system in
Sierra Leone: if civil society has been completely captured, citizens will still find it valuable to
interact with elites and institutions of their power. In places where paramount chiefs are less
constrained, people will be more dependent on their patronage and favors, and thus will find
it useful to make specific investments in the system.9 Having made these investments, indi-
viduals will have an incentive to see this capture of civil society perpetuated in the long run,
which explains positive attitudes towards the system in Sierra Leone and most probably in the
AFRObarometer data.
Our findings are relevant for understanding the role of chiefs in sub-Saharan Africa more
broadly. As we discuss in our concluding remarks, the indirect rule institutions of Sierra Leone
had many similarities to those in other parts of British Africa. In this light, it should not be a
surprise that our findings do resonate with several studies of the political economy of Africa. In
a seminal discussion, Killick (1978) pointed out that it was incorrect to think of interest groups
as capturing or controlling the actions of the state in Ghana since independence (in the light of
the then-dominant paradigm in public choice, e.g., formalized by Becker, 1983). Rather, in line
with Jackson’s and Rosberg’s and our discussion above, Killick notes: “Nkrumah succeeded in
capturing the lobbies; in making them dependent on him instead of himself on them” (p. 39).10
Our paper is most closely related to Anderson, Francois and Kotwal (2011) who show that
in parts of western India where landownership is dominated by Maratha elites, development
outcomes are worse, but social capital is higher. Their interpretation is similar to ours in the
sense that they argue that Marathas block development policies which are not in their interests,
but at the same time poor people are integrated into patron-client relations with the Marathas,
creating high levels of observed social capital. Interestingly, it appears that just as in Sierra
8As one chief from Kono district told us in reply to a question about whether he was able to influence the way
people voted in elections: “if I say left they go left, if I say right they go right.”
9This was observed for instance by Putnam et. al. (1993) in Southern Italy, where despite relatively low levels
of measured “social capital”, citizens are much more likely to visit the offices of local government officials; when
they go, however, they are also much more likely to ask for favors, such as employment.
10Carter (2011) shows how, in Congo Brazzaville, the dictator Denis Sassou-Nguesso forces all the elites to join
a Freemason’s lodge he formed himself as a way of monitoring, which is consistent with our interpretation in the
context of Sierra Leone. In fact, Sassou-Nguesso got this idea from Omar Bongo, former president of Gabon, who
also founded a lodge and historically Masonic lodges played a very similar role in national politics in Sierra Leone
(e.g. Cohen, 1981). Outside of Africa, the point of Collier and Collier’s (1991) groundbreaking study of Latin
American political economy is that the state created the interest groups and manipulated them, not the other
way round.
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Leone, non-elites also have positive attitudes to the elite when the elites are more powerful.
In the context of African politics, Boone (1995, 2003) emphasizes that the way central au-
thorities related to chiefs was critical in determining how post-colonial states formed. Goldstein
and Udry (2008) show that connections to chiefs in Akwapim, Ghana are crucial in determining
property rights to land and hence investment incentives in agriculture, though they themselves
propose a relatively benign interpretation of the chiefs’ actions. Lange (2009) uses data on the
extent to which legal decisions were decided by chiefs as a measure of the intensity of indirect
rule and found this to be negatively correlated with development outcomes at the national level.
Finally, our results and interpretation also suggest that the literature on social capital and
political participation needs to be refined when applied to African politics (and perhaps else-
where). Putnam’s original claim that all social capital was good for governance was critiqued
by Portes and Landolt (1996) and Portes (1998), who argued that social capital could take
perverse forms (e.g., Hitler’s Brownshirts). In response Putnam (2000) distinguished between
“bonding” social capital which is good for a group but not necessarily for society, and “bridging”
social capital which creates links across groups, for instance elites and non-elites, and is thus
unambiguously thought to improve governance outcomes. This refined view appears to be rela-
tively well accepted in the literature.11 In our data, however, it is precisely this bridging social
capital that is higher when chiefs are more powerful and development outcomes worse. Instead,
our results suggest that, under certain circumstances, in particular, related to the weakness of
institutions, it is precisely the “good” types of social capital can be used for local elites as a way
of controlling society. Though most of the development literature has assumed that measures of
social capital in Africa would have the same correlation with development outcomes that they do
in Europe (see Jerven, 2010, for a review), our findings are consistent with what little work has
looked at a more micro level at the relationship between social capital and governance in Africa;
Widner and Mundt (1998), for instance, find that measures of social capital are uncorrelated
with measures of accountability in Botswana and Uganda. In our data, development outcomes
and measures of social capital are in many cases negatively correlated.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present the historical background
of the chieftaincy in Sierra Leone discussing how the institution was created, how it functioned
11See also Grootaert and van Bastelear (2002), who point out in their introduction that social capital can create
negative externalities (citing the Italian Mafia and the Interahamwe of Rwanda), but ultimately conclude that
bridging social capital is associated with positive development outcomes and all of the studies but one in the
book emphasize the positive effects of social capital. Even papers which are critical of the literature emphasize
the efficiency-enhancing potential of social capital, e.g. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005). One exception is Coletta
and Cullen (2002), which argues that the genocides and civil wars in Cambodia and Rwanda were caused by the
presence of strong bonding social capital and weak bridging social capital.
7
and how it has persisted almost unaltered since the turn of the 20th century. A more detailed
discussion of the origins of a sample of chieftaincies and their ruling families, which provides an
important argument for the credibility of our identification strategy, is provided in the Appendix.
Section 3 discusses the survey data we collected and also the data on covariates, and outcome
variables and presents some basic descriptive statistics. Section 4 then examines in detail the
relationship between the number of ruling families and measures of the concentration of their
power. Section 5 focuses on our identification strategy and shows that the number of ruling
families is uncorrelated with pre-colonial measures of development. Section 6 presents our main
results of the number of ruling families on development outcomes, attitudes and measures of
social capital. Section 7 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 Indirect Rule in Africa
While chieftaincies in Africa have their roots in pre-colonial society, the institutions as they exist
today were shaped greatly by colonial indirect rule. Indirect rule across Africa was viewed by
colonial administrators as a way to maintain law and order, and to decrease the cost of local
government administration to increasingly over-extended empires. The idea was simply that
an effective way to govern a colony was to keep in place the existing rulers and rule through
them. Though the policy of indirect rule was articulated more clearly as a tenet of colonial rule
in British Sub-Saharan Africa, French colonial administrations also shaped rural institutions in
similar ways (e.g. Guyer, 1978, Geschiere, 1993). Indirect rule was also common elsewhere in
the world, in colonial Latin America and British India (e.g. Iyer, 2010). Indirect rule shaped
African rural institutions systematically in two ways:
1. The authority to collect taxes and spend revenue, as well as the administration of civil law
and property rights, was reserved for a small number of rural elites.
2. These elites now received their formal authority from the colonial government, obliterating
existing accountability mechanisms.
The lack of accountability in indirect rule institutions is stark. Lord Lugard, the colonial
administrator most widely associated with the intellectual foundations of indirect rule—a model
he elaborated during the pacification and control of Northern Nigeria—wrote in his manual
The Dual Mandate In British Tropical Africa (Lugard, 1922, pg. 203) how chiefs, despite their
freedom to govern their people as they chose, would derive their legitimacy entirely from the
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colonial government: “The chief himself must understand that he has no right to place and
power unless he renders his proper services to the state.” The chiefs, he wrote, “must work for
the stipends and positions they enjoy.” Chiefs were accountable to administrators, but not to
their people. Lugard argued that to be effective chiefs must still be selected according to “native
custom” but the colonial interpretation and institutionalization of “native custom” typically
made chiefs much less accountable than pre-colonial leaders had been, something certainly true
in Sierra Leone (see Abraham, 2003, on Mendeland, Goody ed., 1979, more generally).
2.2 Chiefs in Sierra Leone
The colony of Sierra Leone was established in 1788, primarily as a settlement for freed slaves from
the Americas and Caribbean. The boundaries of the colony initially extended little beyond the
environs of the main settlement and now capital, Freetown. While Portuguese and later British
traders had interacted with locals beginning in the 15th century, the nature of these relationships
had been primarily economic; treaties were signed protecting property rights and trade routes,
but the sovereignty of local peoples over their territory had been recognized unequivocally.
This changed in 1896, when Governor Cardew unilaterally declared a Protectorate over
the interior of the country, stating that signatories of previous treaties with the British colonial
government, then recognized as “native chiefs”with full political autonomy, were now subordinate
to the government in Freetown.12 The colonial government proceeded to establish a system of
indirect rule, assessing a house, or “hut,”tax in 1898, and imprisoning various chiefs who refused
to pay (Chalmers, 1899). Though the Cardew’s declaration of a protectorate sparked the violent
“Hut Tax Rebellion” led by Bai Bureh of Kasseh chiefdom and others, the government was largely
successful in suppressing opposition. Over the next decade it had established the chiefdom, led
by the paramount chief, as a unit of indirect rule that would be an almost exact example of the
model later described by Lugard (1922). The law of Sierra Leone now made the paramount chiefs
responsible for the arbitration of land and legal disputes, the collection of tax revenue, and the
general welfare of their people, creating tremendous opportunities for rent seeking. Moreover,
by making chiefs subjects of the colonial government, the Protectorate Ordinance undermined
many existing checks on the power of chiefs from within the chiefdom.
After the declaration of the Protectorate, the colonial government established a formal system
of succession in the chieftaincy, in which paramount chiefs rule for life, and are elected by
vote of the “Tribal Authority”, a group comprising the members of the chiefdom elite. The
authority also includes the “chiefdom speaker”, an aide to the chief. Chiefdom speakers will
12The appendix in Goddard (1925) lists the treaties and signatories.
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often temporarily take on the role of “regent” or caretaker once a paramount chief dies. At
the turn of the 20th century, these authorities were small groups of approximately 5 to 15
headmen and “sub-chiefs” of the various towns and villages within the chiefdom. Their numbers
have expanded over time. By the 1950s, voting roles in paramount chief elections comprise
approximately 40 to 60 members. The 2009 Chieftaincy Act provides that there must be one
member of the Tribal Authority for every 20 taxpayers. Still, however, the Tribal Authority
comprises mostly members of the rural elite; they are not elected by these taxpayers and neither
is the paramount chief.
The declaration of the Protectorate also made the ruling family the unit of political compe-
tition within the chiefdom. As we will discuss in the following section and the Appendix, the
ruling families can trace their descendants to the leaders of the chiefdom at the turn of the 20th
century, when the institution coalesced and began to “ossify”, to use Abraham’s (2003) lan-
guage. Only members of ruling families are eligible to stand for election. The 2009 Chieftaincy
Act stipulates that a person is qualified to stand as a candidate to be paramount chief if he or
she was born in wedlock to a member of a ruling family. “Where tradition so specifies”, this
requirement is expanded slightly to include anyone with “direct paternal or maternal lineage
to a member of a ruling family, whether born outside of wedlock or not”. A ruling family is
recognized as one that was established before the time of independence in 1961.
Across chiefdoms there is broad consensus on the number of ruling families, though there is
no official list even in the ministry in charge of the elections. A particular person’s membership
in them is at times contested since most people do not have written birth certificates or other
definitive methods of proving their legitimacy. These disputes are resolved in cooperation with
the Provincial Secretary13, and often hinge on whether the aspirant can show his or her relative
was recognized by British officials as being legitimate to stand for election before independence,
and thus was a member of an established ruling family. Before the 2009 Act, elections were
administered under a customary law that maintained the same basic principle: only members
of established ruling families could stand.
Indirect rule also created a large set of opportunities for chiefs to seek rents and distort
local economic activity. Perhaps the most egregious opportunity was provided by the land laws
codified in the Protectorate Land Ordinance of 1927. These laws, still in place today, prohibit
the transaction of land by “non-natives”—those not born of the chiefdom—and place ultimate
13This is currently an office in the Ministry of Rural Development, Internal Affairs and Local Government,
but has its history as an office of the colonial administration. The persistance of the legacy of indirect rule is
highlighted by the fact that central government still uses the administrative structure of the colonial government
to interact with the chiefs.
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ownership of all land in the hands of the paramount chief, who for this reason is often called
the “custodian of the land”. These laws created opportunities for chiefs to capture rents from
both private citizens and the central government. Chiefs used their authority as custodian to
impose elaborate tax structures on those who used the land for agriculture.14 They also used
this same authority to levy taxes on trade in and out of the chiefdoms. In addition, when public
construction is undertaken for roads, schools, clinics and markets by the central government,
the law requires that land lease agreements be negotiated with the chiefs, who often use these
leases to extract payments for themselves.
Another opportunity to create distortions was created by the chief’s role in providing local
public goods from the tax revenue the government mandated them to collect. By the mid
20th century, it had become clear that many paramount chiefs had badly neglected this role.
Lord Hailey examines Sierra Leone’s local tax estimates for the year 1948, in which £134,302
(£3,810,000 in 2011, using a CPI deflator) were raised. Of this revenue, 58% was spent on
administration, “the major part of this”, he writes “representing payments to the Chiefs and
office holders and members of the courts.” Of the remaining expenditure, agriculture is only
3.5%, education 4.6%, forestry 1.9%, and public works 4.3%. Hailey writes, “an examination of
the detailed estimates shows that many of the Native Administrations provide no service at all
under some of these heads.” Out of the 128 for which he had data, “only 51 made provision for
expenditure on Agriculture, 56 for Education and 45 for Forestry.” The public works, he wrote,
were of terrible quality (Hailey, 1950, Part IV, pp. 307-308).
While the chiefs had complete discretion over expenditure of their own revenues, during
the 20th century their native administrations were also the primary conduit through which the
central government administered public services, leaving central government funds in addition
open for capture. No hard numbers are available to corroborate the extent of this capture,
but many failed examples of local government reform suggest that the chiefs wielded near total
control over government administration in the provinces, making the opportunities for capture
large indeed. For instance, the British created local councils early on as a way to distribute public
expenditure, but as shown by Tangri (1978) these were quickly dominated by the paramount
chiefs and were abolished after independence. Cartwright (1970, pg. 44) discusses the role
of the paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone’s Legislative Council in 1947, which formed the basis
for the Parliament at independence in 1961. Council representatives for the Protectorate, who
were intended to oversee central government expenditure in local areas, were chosen through a
14For instance, today in Lokomassama chiefdom, the chiefdom authority levies specific tax rates on a variety of
crops. Non-natives in the chiefdom still complain about arbitrary taxes levied on their output.
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process of indirect elections, at the base of which was the Tribal Authority, meaning that the
Protectorate was “under the control of chiefs rather than effectively controlled by a popular
electorate.” It was not until 2004, under a World Bank sponsored post-war governance reform,
that a system of democratically elected local councils was established to liase with the central
government in determining health, education and agriculture expenditure in rural areas (for a
review, see Casey, 2007).
A final opportunity for the chiefs to exploit their power was created by the government’s
recognition of their authority to compel their subjects to “communal labor”. This authority was
often used to pull scarce labor towards a chief’s land during harvest season, potentially distorting
labor markets. This phenomenon has deep historical roots; domestic slavery was commonplace
in Sierra Leone until the early 20th century, a legacy of Sierra Leone’s role as a major slave
exporter. In 1923 it was estimated that 15% of the Protectorate population was in servitude,
and the chiefs themselves were frequently large slave owners. Domestic slavery was only outlawed
in the Protectorate in 1928, but even then the law was only gradually enforced and in some places
ignored (Arkley, 1965).15 Compulsory labor was frequently a cause of dissent in the chiefdoms,
but complaints by citizens were frequently ignored, both by the colonial administration and later
by the post-independence government.16 The chiefs thus had many opportunities both to create
distortions in trade and labor and agricultural markets, as well as to capture public revenue
that would otherwise have been directed towards public goods.17
15Slavery in many British African territories was not outlawed until the 1920s.
16For instance, chiefdom records at the Forah Bay College National Archives show that in 1966 chiefdom
councillors from a section of Yawbeko chiefdom in Bonthe district lodged a formal complaint with the government.
They alleged that Paramount Chief Joe Jangba had both appropriated land unfairly from their section and
compelled residence to labor without pay on various road projects in the area that would benefit the chief’s
farms. They wrote “it is no [sic] communal labour when force has been put to bear on us. We have been tortured,
molested, illegally fined and sent to the Chiefdom lock-up in case of resistance to work the road.” What is striking
is the response of the Provincial administration, then independent of Britain. In a subsequent letter, the District
officer of Bonthe wrote to the Provincial Secretary in Bo that the matter had been summarily closed:“I confirm
that I have severely warned the petitioners–and everyone present at that–to avoid the slightest repetition of such
questionable conduct,” a reference to their complaint. The petitioners were compelled subsequently to sign an
apology letter, begging obsequiously for forgiveness.
17It is also worth noting that the fundamentally undemocratic chieftaincy institution formed the basis for
national governments after independence. The first Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, himself from a powerful
ruling family in Lower Banta chiefdom, built his Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) not by uniting the population,
but rather by uniting a plurality of paramount chiefs and their representatives in the Legislative Council to
support his government. Without any real tradition of democratic constraints on the state, it is not hard to
generate hypotheses that explain why the country’s government subsequently took such an authoritarian form in
the 1970s and 1980s.
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2.3 Origins of Ruling Families
Our empirical strategy rests on the argument that the number of ruling families within a district
is orthogonal to factors determining social capital and development outcomes today. To support
this argument we provide in the Appendix detailed case studies of six chiefdoms. This both gives
some more context related to the chieftaincy institution in Sierra Leone and also shows vividly
how variation in the number of ruling families typically resulted from idiosyncratic historical
factors at the beginning of the 20th century, such as the availability of male heirs to the forbearer
of the chiefdom, or the organizational structure of an invading tribe’s war party. In all cases,
though there was some flux in the number of families in the late 19th century and at the turn of
the 20th century, the number of families was fixed by around 1920, and did not change thereafter.
In addition, we will show in Section 5 that the number of ruling families is unrelated to
proxies for economic development at the end of the 19th century and to exogenous drivers
of economic prosperity, such as proximity to navigable rivers or the railroad, bolstering the
historical narrative in the Appendix.
3 Data
3.1 Documenting Chieftaincy Institutions
To measure the power of the various paramount chiefs we have created, to our knowledge, the
first comprehensive list of ruling families across chiefdoms, and the first comprehensive history
of the chieftaincy in Sierra Leone.
Though detailed records of some chieftaincy elections exist, many were destroyed during
the civil war when the Provincial Secretaries’ offices in Bo and Makeni were razed, making the
written record insufficient to construct such a dataset. To complement archival records and
secondary sources, we conducted a survey of all 149 chiefdoms.18 To do this, local researchers
with local language skills were trained in qualitative interview methods and visited all 149
chiefdoms. Researchers constructed the lists of ruling families, previous paramount chiefs, and
origin stories of each of the ruling families through extensive interviews with local oral historians,
known as “encyclopedias”.
Researchers were required to visit members of each ruling family in order to ensure that
18Of the secondary sources, Fyfe (1960), which gives a comprehensive history of 19th century Sierra Leone and
information on native rulers, is the most important. See also Alie (1990). Other sources cover different regions
in the country. Abraham (1979, 2003) is authoritative on Mendeland in the south of the country (see also Little,
1951). Wylie (1977) covers Temne country in the north, Finnegan (1965) and Finnegan and Murray (1970) the
Limba country (see also Fyle, 1979a,b, and Fanthorpe 1998). Howard (1972, 1976) studies the 19th century
Guinea border country in the northwest, and Lipschutz’s (1973) study focuses on the northeast.
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they obtained a balanced perspective on the family’s history and the history of the chiefdom.
Researchers operated in teams of two, alternating partners. All regressions obtain identical
results with researcher fixed effects, ensuring our results are not due to measurement error at
the level of the researcher.
There is variation across chiefdoms about how far back the oral historians could recall. Some
chiefdoms are able to trace their histories back until the 18th century, others can only remember
back to the 1930s. In addition, for amalgamation chiefdoms, which were created in the late
1940s and 1950s by the colonial administration by amalgamating certain smaller chiefdoms for
tax collection purposes, researchers were unable to trace lineages of all the component chiefdoms.
Hence our record for these chiefdoms only goes back until the period of amalgamation. This
means that recall is lower in amalgamation chiefdoms on average. Though it does not directly
affect our key variable, the number of ruling families, we wish to control for recall, and we thus
add to all specifications the number of paramount chiefs the historians could recall. In addition,
we also control for whether the chiefdom is created by amalgamation. This is both because of
potential differences in recall in amalgamation chiefdoms, and also because of omitted variable
concerns: before amalgamation, each of the constituent chiefdoms had their own paramount
chief and ruling families; when they were merged each family joined the larger chiefdom. Since
amalgamated chiefdoms tend to be in the more remote and poorer areas, if we did not control
for it, amalgamation would be an omitted variable, correlated both with the number of ruling
families and development outcomes.
Appendix Table 1 gives a list of all of the chieftaincies ordered by district with information on
the number of ruling families, whether or not the chieftaincy was the result of an amalgamation
between previously separate chieftaincies, and also the number of paramount chiefs that our
informants could remember. Table 1 gives some basic descriptive statistics by quartiles of the
number of families. Panel A shows that the mean number of seats (meaning the number of
paramount chiefs that ruled) observed was 5.8. This was slightly larger for chieftaincies in the
lowest quartile of the distribution of the number of families. Panel A of Table 1 also gives data
on the average number of ruling families. The average is 4.0, ranging from one to a maximum
of 12. The table also shows that 30% of the chieftaincies were formed by amalgamation. It
also shows a strong monotonic relationship between amalgamation and the number of families,
which motivates our concern that amalgamation could be of first-order importance, and is worth
controlling for.
Figure 1 shows visually how the numbers of families are distributed geographically in Sierra
Leone. We plot here the quintiles of the number of families with the darkest color being those
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chieftaincies in the top quintile of the distribution (the 30 chieftaincies with the highest number
of families). This figure makes it clear that chieftaincies with many families are not clustered
into any particular area of the country. One is close to Freetown in the west of the country.
Others are right down in the south, west on the coast, or further north on the border with
Guinea. Others are in the far northeast, and still others clustered in the center of the country.
The map also contains the lines of rail and paths of navigable rivers. Again the chieftaincies
with the highest number of families do not seem to cluster around navigable rivers or the railway
lines.
3.2 Outcomes
We study the effect of the number of ruling families on a wide range of development and social
outcomes. Our primary data sources are the 2004 Sierra Leone Census, the 2008 Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS) and the 2007 National Public Services Survey (NPS). We use the
census to study educational and employment outcomes and the DHS to study health outcomes
of children under five. We use the NPS to study attitudinal and social capital outcomes, as well
as asset ownership. Finally, we also use the 1963 census for a cohort analysis of human capital
to study when the gap between chiefdoms with high and low development outcomes began to
occur.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of key development outcomes by dataset.
For educational outcomes, we match individuals to chiefdoms based on chiefdom of birth in order
to identify the link between chieftaincy institutions and long run development.19 The literacy
rate among those born in Sierra Leone’s chiefdoms is very low, at 32%. It is somewhat lower,
31%, for chiefdoms in the lower quartile of the number of families, and somewhat higher, 33%, for
chiefdoms in the highest quartile of the number of families. For primary and secondary schooling,
the mean attainment rates are also very low (35% and 16% respectively), and the raw data do not
vary monotonically with the number of families. The final development outcome we examine in
the census is the proportion of the population in non-agricultural employment.20 Here, we match
employment to chiefdoms based on chiefdom of residence, which seems a reasonable proxy for the
level of contemporary development of the chiefdom, and also to chiefdoms based on chiefdoms of
birth, allowing us to examine the long run trajectory of people born under different chieftaincy
institutions. In both cases, the mean of this variable is very low, at 7% and 13% respectively,
19Similar, in fact stronger, results obtain matching individuals based on chiefdom of current residence, consistent
with an net outflow of human capital from chiefdoms with few ruling families
20Specifically, any job that is not farming, fishing or forestry. A previous version of this paper obtained similar
results using non-agricultural employment excluding public sector workers.
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since most Sierra Leonians are firmly established in agricultural occupations. The higher number
when linking on chiefdom of birth reflects the use of a larger sample that includes people who
were born in the chiefdoms, but later emigrated to urban areas, where there are more jobs. In
both cases, employment rates are higher in the top quartile of the number of families relative to
the bottom. When linking on chiefdom of birth, this relationship is monotonic.21
In the DHS, we are able to study health outcomes for children under five, as well as to
corroborate results from other surveys. The DHS sample, which is smaller, covers only 117 of
149 chiefdoms, but these chiefdoms still span the full range of the numbers of families, from 1 to
12, with quartile averages of the number of families being very close to those in the full sample,
at 2.3, 4, 5, and 7.5. In this dataset, children are matched to chiefdoms based on chiefdom of
current residence, as chiefdom of birth is unavailable. The under five health outcomes from the
DHS reported in Panel B of Table 1 show the poor state of childhood health in rural Sierra
Leone. Average weight for height Z-scores, relative to the World Health Organization Child
Growth standards, are -0.15, with no clear trend by number of ruling families. Average body
mass index Z-scores appear better relative to standards, at -0.014. The incidence of moderate
or severe anemia is very high at 50%.
For our analysis of contemporary attitudes and social capital activities we use the NPS,
matching individuals to chiefdom of current residence.22 The panels C and D of Table 1 present
the data on the attitudinal and social capital variables. For the attitudinal questions there is no
monotonic pattern. However, comparing the extreme quartiles, we see that the share of people
agreeing one should respect authority is 5 percentage points higher in the lowest quartile of the
number of families relative to the highest. For some of the social capital variables, the patterns
are clear. For example, the proportion of people that attended a community meeting rises from
39% in chieftaincies with many families to 46% in those with few. Those who are a member of
a secret society rises from 36% to 44%. The NPS also gives us further development outcomes
that also appear in the DHS. These are mobile phone ownership and whether or not a person’s
house has a cement floor, an indicator of great consequence for welfare during the rainy season.
Comparing the top to bottom quartile in panel B we see that such asset ownership is at least
50% higher when there are more ruling families in a chieftaincy.
21A previous version of this paper presented slightly different versions of these statistics. First, the distribution
of chiefdom averages was presented instead of the raw averages using individual data. Second, attainment was
calculated using an older cohort–only those who could have finished school before the war. This made schooling
outcomes appear lower in magnitude. In this version primary school attainment is presented simply for all
individuals over the age of 12, and secondary school attainment for all individuals over the age of 18. The latter
change is also reflected in our regression tables, but did not change any results.
22Similar results obtain matching on chiefdom of birth.
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3.3 Other Data
To investigate whether the number of ruling families is systematically related to prior develop-
ment outcomes or factors that might help to determine economic development, we also study
the relationship between the number of ruling families and proxies for economic development in
1900. As proxies we use average annual hut tax revenue assessed by the colonial government
between 1898 and 1902. The official tax rate at the time was 10 shillings per house with greater
than four rooms and 5 shillings for every house with three or less rooms (Chalmers, 1899).23
Under the very reasonable assumption that constraints on housing plot size were not binding,
these tax assessments provide a useful proxy for the wealth of a chiefdom at the time.
The source for the tax assessments is Tax Book for Various Chiefdoms and Districts 1898-
1902, which we accessed in June 2010 in the National Archives at Fourah Bay College in Free-
town. The book contains a comprehensive list of the tax assessments on all recognized chiefdoms
at the time. Though many chiefdoms have maintained their boundaries since 1898, some have
not and the mapping to chiefdoms today is imperfect. Historical chiefdoms were manually
matched to current ones using the names of the chiefdom. This work was aided by historical
records, which helped to identify name changes. In three cases, an assessment was recorded
for a chiefdom that is today split into two chiefdoms. In these cases, the assessment was split
between today’s chiefdoms using the relative surface area of the two subdivision chiefdoms as
weights. Annual averages were then constructed for each chiefdom, using the simple mean of
total chiefdom tax assessment for all years observed between 1898 and 1902.24 Across years, an
average £33,254 were assessed annually. In total 91% of this average tax assessment was mapped
successfully to a chiefdom, leaving £3,172 unmapped. A total of 87 contemporary chiefdoms
were linked to a tax assessment. Reliable population estimates by chiefdom are not available
for this time period, so we normalize tax assessment alternatively by square kilometer and 2004
population in our specifications.
One can provide a very rough estimate of whether the total tax assessment observed in these
data is reasonable given the population at the time. According to the 1921 Native Census, the
native population of the Protectorate in 1921 was 1,450,903, an increase from 1,323,151 in 1911.
This implies a 9.6% growth rate over the decade. In 1921, there were 239,148 households, with
an average of 5.9 people per house. If we assume a constant growth rate in the previous decade,
this implies that in 1901 there was a population of 1,207,254, or, using the 5.9 people per house,
23There are 20 shillings to a pound.
24Taxes were not assessed in some areas during some years, particularly in 1899 in the immediate aftermath of
the hut tax rebellion
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204,619 houses. If everyone had a house of 3 rooms less, with £33,254 assessed each year, this
means that about 65% of the houses were assessed. This number matches closely the 58% of
chiefdoms we could match to an assessment. Assuming an uniform distribution of houses across
chiefdoms, this implies an almost complete assessment of the chiefdoms covered.
In addition to the tax data we use distance from the chiefdom centroid to the coast, nearest
navigable river, the railroad, and minimum distance to Sierra Leone’s three major towns as
additional proxies for development in 1900. These variables were calculated using GIS maps
provided by Statistics Sierra Leone.
Panel E of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics from these. The raw averages shows no
monotonic relationship between larger tax assessment and tax assessment per square kilometer
in the chiefdoms and the number of ruling families. Panel E also shows there is no monotonic
relationship between two exogenous causes of economic development in 1900, distance to navi-
gable rivers and distance to the railroad. There is a slight trend visible with respect to distance
to the coast and distance to the 3 largest towns in Sierra Leone, a proxy for urbanization, but
as we discuss in Section 5, these differences are too small to be economically meaningful.
Finally, panel F presents the descriptive statistics on the individual covariates used in our
regressions, using census variables linked to chiefdom on chiefdom of current residence.25 There
is no significant variation in gender and age distributions across the number of families, but
ethnic composition (in terms of Sierra Leone’s three major ethnic groups, the Mende, Temne
and Limba) does vary somewhat with the number of families: the Temne are more concentrated
in the chiefdoms with many families and this relationship is monotonic. The Mende and Limba
are slightly less concentrated in the chiefdoms with many families, but these relationships are
non-monotonic. Despite these non-monotonicities, the variation in the number of families across
ethnic concentration justifies our use of district fixed effects, which should control for differences
in ethnicity (as ethnic groups are relatively concentrated in particular districts).26
We also show that there is no significant variation across number of ruling family quartiles
in filial connections to the chief. The sample means, however, do show substantial direct con-
nections to the chieftaincy among the rural population; 9% of households have a paramount
or section chief in their household (section chiefs are plentiful, and subordinate to paramount
chiefs, controlling sections of the chiefdom). 18% have a village headman in their household,
reflecting the low population density in Sierra Leone, and the small size of villages. Finally, 30%
of household heads are members of a ruling family. This reflects that membership in a family
25Statistics are very similar matching on chiefdom of birth.
26Our core individual level regressions also include dummies for membership in 13 different ethnic groups.
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is relatively loose, often spanning many cousins and second cousins. We will return to these
variables in Section 6.5, where they are used for robustness checks.
4 The Number of Families and the Concentration of Power
Our argument rests on the claim that fewer families creates more opportunities for the con-
centration (and abuse) of power in the paramount chieftaincy. Our first exercise is a “reality
check” to show an empirical link between the number of families and some simple measures of
the concentration of power within a chiefdom — though we cannot measure the concentration
of de facto power, which is most relevant for our argument.
In elections with plurality rule, a standard approach focuses on winning vote margins (see
Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006, for a discussion of this and other approaches), but there is no
comprehensive data on actual voting for chiefs. Instead, we follow Stigler’s (1972) suggestion
and use two measures in the spirit of a Herfindahl index to measure the concentration of power
amongst political parties (see also Acemoglu, Bautista, Querub´ın and Robinson, 2008, for a
similar index to measure the extent to which small number of people controlled local political
power in Colombia). We construct two simple indicators of the concentration of power:
1. A Herfindahl index that measures the extent to which the office of paramount chief has
been dominated by a subset of ruling families over time.
2. The number of times the family that has held the paramount chieftaincy most has done
so (i.e., the maximum of the number of times any family has held the chieftaincy).
In each chiefdom c we observe F c, the set of ruling families, and Sc the set of chieftaincy
seats, as far back as the oral historians can remember. We exclude from this set seats held by
regent chiefs, and seats held by those few chiefs who were viewed as illegitimate for other reasons
(such as J.B. Bunduka of Mandu chiefdom who we discuss in the Appendix). Let N c = |Sc|,
the number of seats observed. Let scf be the number of seats held by family f . The Herfindahl









As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the average Herfindahl across chiefdoms is 0.54, and it is much
higher in chiefdoms with fewer families. Our second measure of the concentration of power
is simply the number of seats held by the family with the most seats, Mc. The mean of this
variable is 3.5.
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To describe the link between the number of families and the concentration of power we run
OLS regressions of the following form,
Cc = γd + γfam · Fc + γn ·Nc + γa ·Amalgamationc + εc, (1)
where the dependent variable Cc is our measure of power concentration in chieftaincy c, either
Hc, the Herfindahl, or Mc, the number of seats held by the most dominant family. We abuse
notation slightly and let Fc stand for either the number of ruling families in chiefdom c or
its logarithm depending on the specification. The γd’s denote a full set of 12 district fixed
effects, which are included in all specifications; Nc is the number of chiefs in the history of the
chieftaincy that our informants could remember in c; and Amalgamationc is a dummy variable
which is equal to 1 if chieftaincy was amalgamated, and equal to 0 otherwise. Finally εc is the
error term.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the negative relationship between the log number of ruling families
and the Herfindahl index, while Panel B shows the relationship between the log number of ruling
families and the maximum times any family has held the chieftaincy. Table 2 shows estimates
of equation (1), documenting the same relationship. Column 1 presents the most parsimonious
version of (1), without including any controls. In Panel A, where the dependent variable is
the Herfindahl, the estimated coefficient γfam = −0.05 with a standard error of 0.01 and is
significant at less than 1%. Panel B shows the same pattern for the number of seats held by the
family with the most seats (γfam = −0.32 with a standard error of 0.06). In both panels the
R2 is relatively high (= 0.20 and = 0.16), suggesting that variation in the number of families
accounts for about 16-20% of the variation in these measures of the concentration of power.
The next three columns progressively include first the baseline controls, Nc and Amalgamationc
(column 2), district fixed effects (column 3), and then fixed effects for the researchers (column
4). The estimated coefficient on Fc is very robust and changes little, while the standard error
changes very little, if at all. The last four columns of the table repeat the same regressions
with the logarithm of the number of families, and show a somewhat more robust and significant
relationship. Given this (and the higher R2 and F statistics in the log specifications), in what
follows we use the log number of ruling families in our core specifications. The log specification
is also appealing in that it is consistent with a diminishing marginal impact of the number of
families in reducing the scope for the concentration of power.
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5 Number of Ruling Families and Pre-Colonial Development
As we discussed in the introduction, a major concern with our empirical strategy is the possibility
that the number of ruling families might be determined by the extent of pre-colonial development
or might be correlated with determinants of 20th-century economic development. Even though
the historical sources and our survey and fieldwork discussed in the Appendix suggest that this
is unlikely to be the case, we also investigate this possibility more systematically. We present
regressions of the form
yc = δd + δfam · Fc + εc, (2)
where yc is the dependent variable of interest (e.g., tax assessments in the late 1890s, or distance
to important geographic features such as the coast or navigable rivers, or distance to the line
of rail from the centroid of the chiefdom). Specifications include no other covariates, except in
some cases, the district fixed effect δd; εc is again the error term. Our objective is to examine
whether the number of ruling families (or its logarithm) is meaningfully correlated with any of
these measures of pre-colonial economic development or potential determinants of subsequent
development. Table 3 shows that they are not.
First we examine the average annual house taxes assessed by the colonial government between
1898 and 1902 a good proxy for economic prosperity at the turn of the 20th century in the area.
Since there are no population estimates for this period, we normalize these taxes by the area of
the chiefdom. In column 1, we look at the relationship between this measure and the number of
ruling families without district fixed effects, and column 2 includes district fixed effects. In both
cases, the estimated effects are small and highly insignificant, providing no prima facie evidence
that the number of ruling families is correlated with prior development outcomes. Moreover, the
negative point estimates suggest, if anything, that there is a negative relationship between the
number of families and prosperity in 1900. This implies that any correlation that exists would
actually mitigate against our findings.27
Though we lack the relevant historical estimates of population, it is quite likely that the
distribution of population within Sierra Leone has remained fairly constant since 1898. This
being the case in columns 3 and 4, we normalize the tax assessments with the population from
the 2004 census. Normalized in that way tax assessments are again not significantly correlated
with the number of ruling families.
27The standard deviation in assessed taxes is very large at £1.17 per square kilometer. If we take the point
estimate of the log form of specification 2, this implies that moving from the mean of the lowest quartile of the
number of ruling families, with 1.8 families, to the mean of the highest quartile, with 7.7 would have decreased
assessed tax by less than 1/5th of a standard deviation.
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In specifications 5, 6 and 7, we examine distance to various drivers of economic prosperity in
the early 20th century, and omit district fixed effects to make our estimates easily interpretable.
Column 5 uses distance to the coast from the chiefdom centroid as the dependent variable. Here
the estimated coefficients on the number of ruling families and its logarithm are significant at
5%: δfam = −5.0 (s.e.=2.1) in the first row, and δfam = −20.1 (s.e.=9.8) in the second row.
Nevertheless, the implied quantitative effects are very small. The predicted difference in the dis-
tance to the coast between a chieftaincy in the bottom and the top quartile of the ruling families
distribution is only 29 kilometers (18 miles). Column 6 uses distance to a navigable river as the
dependent variable, column 7, distance to the railway, and finally, column 8 minimum distance
to the 3 major towns of Sierra Leone, Freetown, Kenema and Bo (a proxy for urbanization). In
each case, the relationship is not statistically significant and quantitatively very small.
We conclude from this evidence that the number of ruling families appears to be uncorre-
lated both with prior measures of economic development and with potential causes of future
development.
6 Main Results
In this section , we present our main results. We first focus on a range of development outcomes,
including education, various school enrollment measures, child health outcomes, non-agricultural
employment, and various measures of asset ownership. We also look at the evolution of literacy
over time. We then turn to various measures of social capital and social attitudes. Our typical
regressions are at the individual level and can be written as follows:
yic = αd + αfam · Fc + αn ·Nc + αa ·Amalgamationc + X′i · αx + εic, (3)
where i denotes the individual and c the chieftaincy, yic is the dependent variable of interest,
which in many of our specifications is a dummy variable, making this relationship equivalent
to a linear probability model. In addition, αd denotes the set of 12 district fixed effects; Fc is
throughout the log number of ruling families in chieftaincy; Nc denotes the number of chiefs
in the history of the chieftaincy that our informants could remember in c; Amalgamationc is
a dummy for whether the chieftaincy was amalgamated, as in (1) and εic is the error term.
The vector X′i, which we include in some specifications, contains the individual level socio-
demographic covariates: age, age, and dummies for gender and ethnicity. The main coefficient
of interest is αfam, the marginal impact of an increase in the log number of ruling families on
our outcomes. Throughout, the standard errors we report are robust to heteroskedasticity, and
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when the data are at the individual level, they are also clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation
across individuals within a given chieftaincy.
6.1 Effects on Development Outcomes
Educational Outcomes Table 4 presents results using individual level data from the 2004
census on three educational outcomes, literacy, primary school attainment and secondary school
attainment. In this table, each left hand side variable is binary. Individuals are matched to
chiefdoms based on chiefdom of birth.28 All columns include district fixed effects and the usual
controls, as discussed above, for the number of seats observed and the amalgamation dummy,
our baseline specification.
All columns show a significant, positive relationship between the number of families and
educational attainment. Column 1, which does not include demographic controls, shows a
significant positive relationship between the number of ruling families and the likelihood that
a person over 12 is literate.29 The coefficient estimate is αfam = 0.051 (s.e.=0.013). The
second column, which additionally includes controls for an individuals age, age squared, gender
and ethnicity, yields an estimate of αfam = 0.046 (s.e.=0.011). The estimates for primary
and secondary school attainment are also very similar. This estimate is not only statistically
significant at less than 1% but also economically large. It implies that moving from the bottom
to the top quartile of the number of ruling families (from 1.8 to 7.7) would increase the likelihood
of literacy, primary school attainment and secondary school attainment by about 7 percentage
points. Reassuringly, the estimates from a separate dataset—the NPS sample of household
heads has significantly lower overall educational attainment—are very similar. This can be seen
in columns 5 and 8, where the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from those from the
census.30
These educational impacts on those born in rural areas suggest that the strength of the
chieftaincy institution is associated with lower education and human capital investment. Our
interpretation, which we will try to bolster further below, is that this association is causal.
Two channels might account for this causal impact. First, more powerful paramount chiefs may
28Similar, in fact stronger, results hold matching on chiefdom of current residence, consistent with a net migra-
tion of human capital out of chiefdoms with fewer families.
29In a previous version, we presented educational attainment results calculated using only data from an older
cohort in order to focus on those who could have finished schooling before the start of the civil war in 1991. The
results are similar for this narrower sample, but throughout this version, we focus on the sample of all individuals
over the age of 12 for primary schooling, and of those over the age of 18 for secondary schooling.
30Similar, though statistically insignificant results obtain in the DHS sample of household members, matching
individuals on chiefdom of current residence. This sample covers only 117 of 149 chiefdoms, and is less educated
relative to the census.
23
be mismanaging funds. Though the central government is responsible for a large fraction of
school expenditure, chiefdoms must decide whether to contribute their own funds. In addition,
paramount chiefs must be consulted, as legal custodians of the land, before schools are con-
structed. Particularly before the civil war, they had considerable influence over the selection
and salaries of teachers in the area they controlled. Second, paramount chiefs may have actively
opposed education in their chiefdoms, for example to be able to better exert authority over the
people. Our data do not enable us to finely distinguish these two channels.
Child Health Outcomes In Table 5, we study the impact of the number of ruling families on
health using the DHS sample, which contains information on the weight for height, body mass
index and anemia levels of children under five years of age—all outcomes that are both direct
measures of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and have been linked to socioeconomic outcomes later
in life (see Strauss and Thomas, 2007, for a review). Column 1, which focuses on the weight for
height Z-score and is again without demographics controls, leads to an estimate of αfam = 0.212
(s.e.=0.117), significant at 7%. In column 2, which additionally controls for the age, primary
school attainment and ethnicity of the mother, the estimate is very similar. These estimates
imply that moving from the bottom to the top quartile of the number of ruling families increases
a child’s height for weight Z-score by 0.41, or nearly half a standard deviation.31
The results for the body mass index Z-score in columns 3 and 4 are similar, though not
statistically significant. In columns 5 and 6 the left-hand side variable is a dummy for whether
the child tested positive for severe or moderate anemia in a hemoglobin test. We again find
significant results with economically meaningful implications. For example, moving from the
lowest to highest quartile of number of families decreases the likelihood of a child having severe
or moderate anemia by 13 percentage points.
The most obvious explanation for these patterns is that, as with education, paramount chiefs
have been, until very recently, the main conduit through which government health spending
flowed to rural areas of Sierra Leone; for example, NGO programs to aid health and government
clinics all must be developed with the approval of the chiefs, creating substantial opportunities
for the capture of funds. A second possibility, however, is that paramount chiefs, who wield
substantial power over economic life in Sierra Leone, may engage in various activities that hold
back economic development in the area, and malnourishment and other adverse child health
outcomes result from low incomes of their parents. We turn to this topic in the next subsection,
31Z-scores in this dataset were calculated by DHS researchers using the World Health Organization’s 2006 Child
Growth Standards.
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in which we investigate the effect of the number of families on measures of economic prosperity.
Economic Outcomes Table 6 presents results for a variety of contemporary economic out-
comes from the census and the NPS. Since it is not clear whether these outcomes should be
impacted mainly by chiefdom of current residence or of birth, we report results with both. We
start with the fraction of the population working outside agriculture.32 Though Sierra Leone’s
chiefdoms are predominantly agrarian, non-agricultural employment for those currently residing
in the chiefdom is a useful proxy for contemporary economic development. Columns 1 and 2
show a statistically significant (at 5%) association between number of ruling families and non-
agricultural employment for both chiefdom of residence and of birth. This relationship is slightly
stronger when matching on chiefdom of current residence, consistent with migration of skilled
labor out of chiefdoms with fewer families.33 The effects are again sizable. Using the coeffi-
cient in column 2, moving from the bottom to the top quartile of the number of ruling families
increases non-agricultural employment in the chiefdom by 3 percentage points off a base of 7
percent.
The remaining left-hand side variables in Table 6 measure various dimensions of asset own-
ership. First, we look at mobile phone ownership observed for households in the NPS. In both
specifications (columns 3 and 4), we estimate positive effects of the number of ruling families on
mobile phone ownership, however the relationship is only significant (at 1%) when matching on
chiefdom of birth. These magnitudes are again sizable. Using column 3, changing chiefdom of
birth from the bottom to top quartile of the number of ruling families increases the likelihood
of mobile phone ownership by 9%. The fact that this relationship is stronger when matching on
chiefdom of birth is consistent with the fact that there are many more opportunities to accu-
mulate wealth outside of the chiefdoms. In columns 5 and 6, we look at whether the household
owns a cement or tile floor, which, relative to the alternative of a dirt floor, is a great bene-
fit to households, especially in the rainy season when houses often flood; the results are again
similar.34
In total, these results all suggest that unconstrained paramount chiefs retard the development
32In particular, our variable is a dummy for whether an individual over the age of 10 is employed in teaching,
medical work, security, utilities, manufacturing, construction, trade, hospitality, transportation, or a financial
industry, and not fishing, farming or forestry.
33Recall we find a similar pattern for education: effects are stronger matching on chiefdom of current residence,
consistent with a net migration of human capital out of chiefdoms with fewer families.
34Similar, though insignificant results obtain in the DHS for similar variables and also for their wealth index
coded from materials used for housing construction, and types of water access and sanitation facilities. This might
be because the DHS sample only covers only 117 of 149 chiefdoms, and does not allow one to match individuals
to chiefdoms based on chiefdom of birth.
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of the modern economy within their chiefdoms, and harm the economic prosperity of individuals
born in their chiefdoms. One channel through which chiefs might harm the local economy
directly is through the levying harsh fines (often in ways rural people consider illegitimate and
though what they refer to as “kangaroo courts”) or perhaps punitive taxes on market traders,
both of which are common occurrences as we have discussed above. Asset accumulation of those
born in the chiefdom may be affected by the effects on human capital accumulation described
above.
6.2 Literacy over Time
We next investigate the timing of literacy effects we documented in Table 4. This allows us
to understand better when the differences in outcomes across chiefdoms began to emerge. In
particular, we run separate regressions of literacy among different birth cohorts on the log num-
ber of families using data from the 1963 and 2004 censuses.35 Table 7 reports these coefficients
and Figure 3 plots them.36 For example, first column in the top panel of Table 7 shows the
impact on pre-1918 birth cohorts; the second column are on the 1919-1923 birth cohort, etc.
Table 7 and Figure 3 show an impact on literacy steadily growing over time; estimates for the
earliest birth cohorts are both statistically insignificant and quantitatively small. They grow
over time and, with the exception of 1924-1928, become significant only after the 1940s birth
cohorts, and becoming much larger after the 1950s birth cohorts. This pattern is plausible in
the context of history of the chieftaincy institution. The paramount chiefs were the arm of gov-
ernment through which schools in Sierra Leone were first established in the early 20th century.
One of the first government schools, the Bo Government Secondary School, was established in
1906 and funded explicitly from chiefs’ contributions. Tax records at Fourah Bay College show
agreements between district commissioners and chiefs across the country indicating the amount
of tax revenue that would be donated to local schools. Though this authority over schools was
established in 1896, there was quite a bit of flux in the early years and it took time for the ruling
families and paramount chiefs to consolidate and exercise their new powers. Cartwright (1970)
documents that paramount chiefs started dominating appointments to the Legislative Council
during the 1950s and early 1960s, when it was in charge of educational spending. In this light,
35While individual level micro data, which we use above, is available for the 2004 census, only chiefdom cohort
aggregates are available in the 1963 census. For consistency in this table, we present results for cohorts observed
in the 2004 census using aggregates as well. Identical results obtain as expected however using the micro data for
later cohorts.
36As we noted above, there is a slight difference in the data used here relative to those used in Table 4. While in
Table 4 individuals observed in the 2004 census were matched to chiefdoms based on chiefdom of birth, individuals
in this subsection are matched based on chiefdom of residence to ensure consistency with the 1963 census, which
does not report education by chiefdom of birth.
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it is plausible for divergence across chieftaincies to also have emerged during this period.
6.3 Social Attitudes
We now turn to our data from the 2007 National Public Services (NPS) survey about (social)
attitudes. If the hypothesis of despotic chiefs, which is consistent with the evidence presented
so far, is correct, one would except more powerful chiefs to be less legitimate or popular. We
will see that the actual pattern is very different from this expectation.
The NPS attitudinal questions were carefully designed so as not to lead respondents towards
one answer or another. Respondents were given two statements in the local lingua franca, Krio,
and asked to say which was closest to their view. The could either agree with one, both, or
none. In the first question they were given the statements:
1. As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders.
2. In our country these days, we should have more respect for authority.
Our first attitude variable is a dummy for whether they agree with statement 2. A second
question had the statements:
1. Responsible young people can be good leaders.
2. Only older people are mature enough to be leaders.
This question is relevant because, as is discussed in Richards (1996), the elder/youth divide in
Sierra Leone is often one of the most salient ways of distinguish those associated with the power
structure of the chieftaincy (the elders) and those outside of the power structure (the youth). In
fact, any person under the age of 50 is often called a “youth” with significant consequences for
power and politics (and the civil war is often portrayed as a rebellion of youths against elders;
see in particular Richards, 1996, Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008, Mokuwa, Voors, Bulte and
Richards, 2011, Peters, 2011). We create a second dummy indicating whether the respondent
agrees with item 2 in this question.
Table 8 reports the results.37 The first two columns refer to “respect for authority” and
the next two are about “only older people leading”. Columns 1-2 show that with or without
demographics controls chieftaincies with more ruling families report lower respect for authority.
37In these specifications, individuals are matched to chiefdoms of current residence. Our results are in fact
even stronger when matching on chiefdom of birth, indicating that effects on attitudes are persistent, even with
emigration.
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These effects are all significant at 5%. Columns 3-4 show similar effects for the second variable,
indicating greater willingness to accept young leaders in chieftaincies with more ruling families,
though these effects are not significant at standard confidence levels.
These results are rather surprising at first blush. If more powerful paramount chiefs are
responsible for poorer development outcomes, one would expect attitudes towards their power
to be unfavorable. But this does not seem to be the pattern here.
6.4 Bridging and Bonding Social Capital and Collective Action
Finally we examine the impact of the number of ruling families on measures of social capital
from the NPS. In particular, we have seven different measures, each with yes or no answer:
1. Have you attended any community meetings in the past month?
2. In the past year, have you talked with the Local Councillor or been to a meeting organized
by the Local Council?
3. In the past year, have you talked with the Paramount Chief or been to a meeting organized
by the Paramount Chief?
4. Do you belong to a school management committee, such as Parent Teachers Association?
5. Do you belong to a labor gang?
6. Do you belong to a secret society?
7. Have you participated in road brushing or town cleaning in the past month?
Three groups of activities can be distinguished here. The first group, consisting of attendance
at a community meeting, attendance at a local council meeting and attendance at meetings with
the chief, proxies for “bridging” social capital, to use the terminology of Putnam (2000), which
consists of links between citizens and the elites. These activities represent investments by citizens
in building relationships with the elites of the chiefdom.
The second group of activities, membership in a school committee, membership in a labor
gang and membership in a secret society are all proxies for “bonding” activities used to build
social capital between others of similar social status. School committees are organizations like
the Parent Teacher Association, designed to help parents oversee their children’s’ schooling.
Labor gangs are typically groups of young men who get together and collectively sell their labor
on farms or on construction projects. Secret societies are heavily involved in the spiritual and
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cultural life of the communities but also play important roles in dispute resolution and the
allocation of land and other resources. It has been argued, for example by Little (1965, 1966),
that as such they can act as a check on the political power of chiefs, though he presents little
more than circumstantial evidence for this. Little’s work points out that, though these variables
proxy for “bonding” capital, they may also contain an element of “bridging” capital as well.
Particularly in school committees and secret societies, citizens may form relationships with the
elite and the paramount chief, as well as with one another.
The final category of activity, collective action, includes one variable, participation in “road
brushing,” or the cutting of bush along the road to make it navigable, which can be seen as
the voluntary provision of a public good and indicative of a community’s ability to engage in
collective action. This same indicator is used to proxy for collective action by Glennerster, Miguel
and Rothenberg (2011) in their investigation of the connection between ethnic fractionalization
and collective action in Sierra Leone.
In Table 10 we report the results of regressions with left hand side variables given by a
dummy equal to 1 for each one of these outcome variables. Panel A of Table 9 reports the
correlations between these variables, showing that generally they capture different aspects of
social capital, so are only imperfectly correlated, with a somewhat greater correlation activities
within the same category.
Table 10 shows a negative impact of the number of ruling families on all of these measures
of social capital. For example, for attendance of community meetings, the coefficient estimate
is αfam = −0.086 (s.e.=0.025), while for the bonding activities such as membership in labor
gangs or secret societies, the coefficients are αfam = −0.073 (s.e. = 0.023), and αfam = −0.065
(s.e.=0.033), respectively. There is a similar negative impact on participation in road brushing
with a coefficient estimate of αfam = −0.075 (s.e.=0.035). All of these are economically and
quantitatively significant effects. Note as well that all specifications include district fixed effects
and individual level ethnicity dummies, which bolsters our confidence that these results are not
due to unobserved cultural variation.38
Just like the results for the social attitudes, the pattern here is clear but at odds with
expectations based on chiefs as despots view: the less constrained is the paramount chief, the
greater the measured social capital. One would have expected social capital to be diminished
in the presence of despotic leaders. This is true both for bonding and bridging type activities.
Moreover, Panel B of Table 9 shows a generally negative correlation between social capital
38Estimates also do not change significantly when removing individual level ethnicity dummies, further sup-
porting this claim.
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and development outcomes at the level of chiefdom aggregates, again contrary to expectations.
Though seemingly contradictory to our evidence on development outcomes, which supports the
chiefs as despots view, we believe these results are quite plausible in light of the institutional
structure of sub-Saharan Africa in general and Sierra Leone in particular. The idea is simple: a
bridge can be crossed in either direction, meaning that bridging social capital can be used as a
vehicle to assert social control. In this view, powerful chiefs may not just distort the allocation
of resources to education or discourage the non-agricultural sector. In order to enhance their
control over society, they may need also to monitor it and bring the people together so as to tell
them what to do. While it is possible that some of these activities are in the collective good,
many of them may simply be in the private interest of the chiefs and their families. This point is
made explicitly in the anthropological literature on Sierra Leone, in particular by Murphy (1990)
and also by Ferme (2001). Murphy emphasizes that in Sierra Leone community meetings—the
outcome in column 1 of Table 10—are often used as a form of social control, and are used by
elites to construct the appearance of governance based on community consensus, when in fact
consensus has little to do with their decisions. Murphy (p. 28) writes
“public forms [of discourse] are often recognized as an illusion masking alternative
commitments arranged in secret.... a key attribute of the mature person or a suc-
cessful group is the ability to strategically construct [...] public appearances”.
Other outcomes can be interpreted in the same way. Road brushing, which on its face is a
public good, was historically one of the services the chiefs compelled their citizens to do on behalf
the colonial administration; most treaties in fact stipulated that chief’s stipends depended on
keeping the roads clean.39 Labor gangs, while today an important forum in which young men
commune with one another, have their institutional legacy in the provision of the communal
labor demanded by paramount chiefs for their farms. Labor gangs today are a useful institution
in which chiefs dispense patronage, giving a preferred group of youths, for example, a paying
job on a government road or culvert construction project.
The fact that we see in chiefdoms with fewer families greater participation in both bridging
and bonding activities may just reflect the fact that bridging and bonding activities are comple-
ments. The chiefs summon up bridging for their own purpose, but when they do so they have
to accept that this simultaneously creates opportunities for bonding between citizens.40
39Glennerster, Miguel and Rothenberg (2011) suggest that powerful chiefs may order people to brush roads in
rural Sierra Leone though they do not have a measure of this power with which to test this conjecture.
40In results not reported we found that the number of families had a near zero effect on measures of trust in
others in the locality. We investigated trust with the question: “In your opinion do you believe [....] or do you
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This interpretation may also have relevance for why powerful chiefs who apparently inhibit
development command greater authority and respect. The apparent contradiction arises simply
because in the process of building bridges between chiefs and their citizens, citizens themselves
make specific investments in their relationships with the chiefs, giving citizens an interest in the
perpetuation of the institution. Once people have invested in the social network of the chief and
entered into a patron-client relationship, they have no interest in seeing his or her power diluted
by, for example, the youth. In fact, they might prefer having it strengthened. Our interpretation
is similar to that of Ntsebeza (2005) who examined the role of chiefs in rural South Africa and
argued that
“traditional authorities derive their authority from their control of the land allocation
process, rather than their popularity amongst their subjects ... the need for land ...
compelled rural residents willy-nilly to cooperate with the traditional authorities”
(p. 22).
Ribot (2001) articulates a similar view which could best be summed up as: legitimacy follows
power.
6.5 Robustness: Connections to Chieftaincy Elite
This paper has argued that a larger number of ruling families has caused more political com-
petition for chieftaincy and better development outcomes. An alternative explanation for our
results, however, could be that the number of ruling families is associated with a broader distri-
bution of patronage within the chiefdom that raises observed means of development outcomes.
Under this hypothesis, it would not be better governance driving the results, but rather a differ-
ent structure of the patron-client network. The NPS allows us to test this hypothesis directly.
It includes three measures of connections to the chieftaincy elite: whether the respondent has
a paramount or section chief in the household, whether the respondent is a member of a ruling
have to be careful in dealing with them?” “Believe” is a close translation of the Krio word for trust. We code trust
as a dummy for those who respond you can believe the person in question. In the preferred specification, with all
demographic and elite controls, the effect on trust in other people in the locality is αfam = 0.001 (s.e.=0.027).
This is consistent with paramount chiefs not having a great effect on “bonding” social capital between citizens.
We also find insignificant effects on trust in chiefdom officials. The coefficient for the same trust question
asked about chiefdom officials is αfam = 0.019 (s.e.=0.032). We also examine answers to the question: “If the
Paramount Chief was given 500 million Leones ($125, 000) to complete a project in this area, do you believe
they would spend all the money doing a good job on the project or would they cut some of the money?” (“cut”
meaning take for their own purposes). We code an indicator for respondents who report the chief would either
“do a bad job and cut most of the money” or “they would just take all the money”. The coefficient on this is
again insignificant, at αfam = 0.031 (s.e.=0.026). The null effect here is difficult to interpret. A negative answer
might be good or bad, depending on the individual’s position to a chief’s patronage network.
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family, and whether the respondent has village headman in the household. Table 11 shows first
that our core results are robust to the inclusion of these controls. As expected, the coefficients
on connections to the chieftaincy elite are generally positive (and sometimes statistically signif-
icant), except in the case of the village headman in columns 1, 2 and 3. The negative sign on
this coefficient should be interpreted with caution; and cannot be taken to imply that village
headman are worse off than the average citizen within the chiefdom. This coefficient describes
the effect of being a village headman who is not connected to the chieftaincy elite, either through
relation to a more senior chief, or by membership in a ruling family. If we add the partial effects
of these other connections, the total effect of being a well-connected headman is statistically
indistinguishable from zero.41
We can also investigate directly potential flows of patronage within the chiefdom. Patronage
to rural elites could be related to the number of families on the extensive and the intensive
margin. On the extensive margin, it could be that in places with more families, there are simply
more people who are affiliated with the ruling families, each of whom demands a transfer. We
provide evidence against this hypothesis in Table 12, which indicates that there is not more
broad-based membership in ruling families or an increased likelihood of having a paramount
chief or headman in the household in chieftaincies with more ruling families.
On the intensive margin, it could be that a given elite in a chiefdom with more ruling families
demands more patronage, since his or her vote is now more likely to be pivotal in an election.
We investigate this hypothesis in Table 13, which shows estimates of the following regression,
yic = βc + βelite · Ei + βfam · (Ei × Fc) + X′i · βx + εic, (4)
where yic is a development outcome for individual i in chiefdom c, βc is a chiefdom fixed effect and
Ei is a dummy indicating a connection of individual i to the chieftaincy elite. The coefficient
βfam describes how outcome differences between chiefdom elite and non-elites vary with the
(log) number of families. The vector X′i includes the same individual level socio-demographic
covariates as in previous specifications. The broadly negative estimates of βfam show that within
chiefdoms, inequality between elites and non-elites is, if anything, declining with the number
of ruling families. This result is inconsistent with a more intensive distribution of patronage
driving our results. In fact, the pattern in Table 12 strengthens our argument as it suggests that
more competition for the chieftaincy produces more equality (less different outcomes) between
elites and non-elites.
4158% of households with headmen also include either a ruling family member or a paramount or section chief.
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7 Concluding Remarks and Implications
In this paper we investigated the consequences of the power of chiefs on development in Sierra
Leone. This is important for several reasons. In a continent where the majority of the population
live in rural areas and where the national state lacks capacity and the power to “penetrate”
society, the institutions of local governance may be pivotal in shaping development outcomes.
Yet they have received little systematic empirical investigation. Further, though the institution
of the chieftaincy was often a pure creation of colonial states, and though there have been
attempts to demolish it, chiefs still exercise considerable power across Africa. Finally, there are
also several apparently mutually incompatible views about the chieftaincy; on the one hand there
is the argument made famous by Mamdani (1996) that the chiefs are unaccountable despots,
yet at the same time there is a great deal of survey evidence that chiefs command the respect
of rural people.
Based on a unique survey, complemented by field and archival research on the histories of the
chieftaincies, paramount chiefs and ruling families of Sierra Leone as far back as sources could
deliver, we developed a measure of institutional constraints on the power of paramount chiefs.
Using this measure, we show that, consistent with the chiefs as despots view, in places where
chiefs are less constrained and more powerful a variety of development outcomes are significantly
worse. However, in contrast to expectations that would naturally follow from this view, these
more powerful chiefs command greater respect, and their chieftaincies have greater levels of
both bonding and bridging type of social capital, generally believed to be associated with better
accountability and good governance.
On the face of it these results seem to suggest that both Mamdani and his critics can
simultaneously be right—or wrong. Though this is true in some sense, we suggest that the
right interpretation of our findings is in the spirit of Mamdani’s argument, but goes further in
recognizing the institutional context of sub-Saharan Africa and Sierra Leone. We argue that
powerful chiefs lead to worse development outcomes because they distort incentives to engage
in economically desirable activities through their control of taxation, regulation and the judicial
system. Yet at the same time they are associated with higher levels of social capital, particularly
bridging activities because they use this capital as a way to control and monitor society. This
mechanism may also induce people to invest in patron-client relations with powerful chiefs, thus
giving them a vested interest in the authority of chieftaincy. Thus in surveys people do say that
they respect the authority of chiefs, but this is not a reflection of the fact that chiefs are effective
at delivering services or public goods. Rather, it reflects the fact that rural people are locked
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into relationships of dependence on the traditional authorities.
It is useful to note that though our evidence comes from a specific country, Sierra Leone, with
necessarily unique institutions, there are many commonalities between Sierra Leone and other
British colonies, suggesting that our conclusions might have some external validity. The indirect
rule institutions established in Sierra Leone were common elsewhere in British Africa. Using a
broad definition of the term, the British protectorates of Africa were all administered by some
form of indirect rule. The places most similar to Sierra Leones are those in which the pre-colonial
societies had “segmentary states” (Southhall, 1956), where pre-colonial states were generally
small groupings of villages headed by a chief advised by a committee of headmen.42 Segmentary
states were very common, including the Gisu, the Kiga and the Alur in East Africa.43 Another
system analogous to ours is the Tanganyika Federation of chiefdoms around lake Tanganyika
(Richards, 1960). These chiefdoms, similar in size to those in our area, were led by a single chief
who had a “royal family”—the banang’oma—that provided services to his administration and
also administered justice. In these chiefdoms there was not more than one royal family, but as
colonialism progressed, officials did establish systems of election of chiefs, which forced aspirants
to appeal to bases of political support outside the banang’oma.44
42The places most dissimilar to our context are those either with a strong centralized states that were well
established before the colonial period, or those completely lacking political centralization, even chiefs. In the
former category such as Asante in Ghana, Benin or Hausaland in Nigeria or Buganda in Uganda, the British
chose to recognize the heads of state and work with them. The indirect rule institutions established here differ
from those in Sierra Leone primarily in that unit of government was much larger—indeed during the 19th century
the Asante empire spanned much of contemporary Ghana. The degree of electoral competition was also much lower
in these places, in part because the British found it preferable not to alter the strong monarchical institutions that
had already been established. These places can then be seen as having the characteristics of extreme observations
in our dataset—chiefdoms with only one ruling family—albeit on much larger scale. What is similar to our setting
is that the impact of indirect rule removed checks and balances and important elements of accountability that
had generally existed prior to colonialism (for example the case studies in Crowder and Ikime, 1970, uniformly
argue this point). In the latter category the absence of clear leaders in such places forced the British to appoint
leaders with no primary legitimacy at all (Jones, 1970, Afigbo, 1972 on the Nigerian cases). The French chose
similar action in south-eastern Cameroon, where they recognized arbitrarily chosen outsiders to be chiefs of the
Maka, a group not accustomed to central authority (Geschiere, 1993). In these cases, unlike Sierra Leone, the
colonial chiefs could not maintain their legitimacy after independence.
43The Gisu, for instance, had a complex system of lineages, which were similar to ruling families. Each linage
had its own village, and then higher chiefs were selected from among these linages, similar to many chiefdoms
in Sierra Leone, where families are often associated with different sections of the chiefdom. This system was
maintained after colonialism, as elections were established and those who stood to be chief gained their legitimacy
to do so from membership in the lineages. The Kiga provide another example; before colonialism they were
organized in mobile clans. As the Ugandan protectorate developed, they were settled and various clans, each
with their own lineages, and were forced to settle together. Linkages to the old clans became the basis to stand
for office of the chief. Ferguson and Wilks (1970) describe similar societies in northern Ghana. Pre-colonial
societies in many parts of Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe) were also similar,
although there the British conquest, which was more brutal, did more to destroy existing institutions. Systems of
headman elections were established, and those candidates with connections to the pre-colonial elite still derived
some authority from those connections, despite being afforded less of the pomp provided to the Paramount Chiefs
in Sierra Leone (Hailey, 1950, Part II).
44To describe how new chiefs are selected, the chapter in Richards (1960) makes an analogy to the selection
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Our findings have various implications for understanding the process of economic and in-
stitutional development in sub-Saharan Africa. Most significantly they suggest that simple
applications of the principal-agent approach to political accountability and its relation to social
capital may need to be modified. In terms of development policy many international aid agen-
cies are now heavily involved in attempts to “strengthen” civil society and social capital in the
hope that this will increase local accountability and public good provision. The World Bank
pours millions of dollars into Community Driven Development schemes (for example in Sierra
Leone, Casey, Glennester and Miguel, 2011, Liberia, Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Humphreys, de la Sierra, van der Windt, 2012).
Yet our results give cause for concern: if civil society, at least in the way it exists in rural Africa
today, is captured by chiefs, efforts to strengthen it might just strengthen the control of the
chiefs over it. We believe that future research investigating these questions in greater detail
would be particularly interesting. A major question is whether interventions that strengthen
civil society organizations within a given institutional structure improve governance or further
bolster existing institutional arrangements, even if they are dysfunctional.
of the Pope. Royal families would get together and select a candidate, who was at times challenged by other
members of the community. In some cases alternative candidates would be proposed by other organized groups,
for instance the elika, or young men’s society. In this sense, there was both an established system of electoral
competition, and various constituencies from which candidates drew their legitimacy to stand for election.
35
Appendix: Origins of Ruling Families
We have argued that the origins of the number of ruling families is historically idiosyncratic.
In this appendix, we detail the histories of six chiefdoms, whose families’ origins exemplify the
origin stories common in other chiefdoms. In a companion article, Reed and Robinson (2012),
available online, we detail the histories of all 149 chiefdoms and their families.
Koya chiefdom, of eastern Kenema district is near the median of the distribution with three
ruling families. Local historians trace its origin to a warrior named Menima Kpengba. Kpengba
was an ethnic Gola, who is believed to have migrated from present day Liberia. It is difficult to
date Kpengba’s arrival, as there is little historical record of the Golas in Sierra Leone, except
from some mention of them by Portuguese travelers in the early 16th century. Kup (1962, p.
127) writes, citing these sources, that “it is likely [...] the Golas have lived for a very long time in
small numbers amongst the creeks which intersect the thick forest of the south.” The chiefdom
today recognizes three ruling families, all whom have contested the two most recent elections:
Komai, Sellu and Kanneh.
The Komai and Sellu families both trace their lineages to the Gola people that migrated
with Kpengba, and are affiliated with different towns in the chiefdom, Gbogbuabu and Bongor,
respectively. It is common across chiefdoms for families to have different “headquarters”. In
Koya, this is a legacy of the decentralized nature of Gola society. When the British arrived
seeking leaders with which to sign treaties, groups organized themselves to present the visitors
with a leader. The political structure of the chiefdom was then determined by the relationships
formed between groups at the time to support a signatory to the treaty, the headquarters within
the chiefdom representing the homes of the different groups.
The first paramount chief in Koya to be recognized by the colonial government was Joseh, of
the Komai family, who signed a treaty at Gbogbuabu with Travelling Commissioner Thomas J.
Alldridge on April 20th, 1890.45 The stipulations of the Alldridge treaty were identical to many
of the others signed throughout the 19th century, and it is common for families to trace their
lineage to the member who first signed a treaty with the British. In this sense, these treaties
mark the beginning of the chieftaincy institution, in which the colonial government recognized
the signatories as the primary liaisons between the government and the people. Under the treaty,
Joseh promised the rights of free passage, property and construction to British subjects, as well
as reserved adjudication of any disputes between his people and British subjects for the Governor
in Freetown. “So long as the above conditions are carried out, and the roads are kept clean,”
45Fourah Bay College Archives, Treaty, April 20, 1890: Borgbahboo.
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the treaty reads, “Chief Joseh shall receive an annual present of ten pounds.” By mandating the
provision of services in exchange for the favor of the government, the treaty established the basis
of the clientelistic relationship of indirect rule: the chief would receive money and legitimacy
from the government, independent of any services provided for his people.
Cordial relations between the government and Joseh did not continue however. Joseh joined
the rebellion in 1898 against the declaration of the Protectorate, and in retaliation Captain
Carr, who led opposition to the rebellion in the area, burned Gbogbuabu to the ground. Joseh
was deposed and imprisoned for a year. Joseh returned to office in 1899, at the age of “35 to
40”, and was ultimately succeeded by his younger brother Kormeh, by unanimous vote of 32
tribal authorities in 1907.46 That Joseh, as with most chiefs imprisoned after the rebellion,
was able to return to power and pass the chieftaincy to his brother shows the resilience of the
families to shocks from without. A central tenant of Lugard’s manual for indirect rule was the
policy of non-interference with local custom. Though the British institutionalization may have
heavily influenced the ways chiefs interacted with their citizens once the system was created,
external interventions into the politics of the chieftaincy were rare and when they occurred had
no persistent effect.
After Kormeh’s death in 1920, oral historians report that a Sellu Ngombu, of the Sellu family,
held the chieftaincy. A 1920 letter to Freetown from the District Commissioner states that after
Kormeh’s death a regent chief was elected immediately,47 “so that delay in finding a successor,
which has resulted in so much dissension in the neighboring Chiefdom (Tunkia), might not cause
trouble here.” It is common practice for regent or “caretaker” chiefs, sometimes from ruling
families, to hold office between chieftaincy elections. Sellu Ngombu was this same caretaker.
Though holding this caretaker role in this early period gave his family enough legitimacy to
stand in future elections, they is still viewed as somewhat less legitimate than the Komai family
and have been unable to win any subsequent elections.
This example illustrates a common feature across chiefdoms, which is that a family may
have obtained the right to stand for paramount chief through service as regent chief early in the
history of the chiefdom. The existence of such families is random in the sense that whether or
not someone had the opportunity to become regent early on depended on whether an original
paramount chief had a clear successor; in this case Kormeh had no son. Though the Sellu family
has not won a seat since, they do still command votes in the Tribal Authority, and so represent
a group that must be lobbied in chieftaincy elections.
46Provincial Secretary’s Office, Kenema: Kenema District Decree Book.
47Provincial Secretary’s Office, Kenema: Kenema District Decree Book.
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The third ruling family, Kanneh, has dominated the chiefdom since Kormeh. Kormeh’s
death and Sellu Ngombu’s weakness left a vacuum that was filled by a local family not related
the treaty’s original signatories. It is likely that Kanneh was related to a section chief who had
ruled an area of the chiefdom under Kormeh and Sellu. It is common across chiefdoms for the
absence of a clear heir to the chiefdom’s forbearer early on to lead to the legitimation of new
families. Take, for instance, Bagbo chiefdom, in Bo District. Bagbo traces its origins to Boima
Jah, a warrior and hunter who settled the area, and was chief from 1847 until his death in 1884.48
The chiefdom today recognizes four families: Jah, Idriss, Coker and Colia. The Colia family,
which follows the lineage of another family living in the chiefdom at the time of Boima Jah, has
contested but never won a chieftaincy election. The Idriss and Coker families emerged because
Boima Jah did not have any sons, and after his death there was no immediate successor. Idriss,
the chiefdom speaker, succeed Jah as regent chief. Similar to Sellu Ngombu, though Idriss had
no blood relationship to Jah, he was so respected for his service that his family has come to
be considered a ruling family. After Idriss’s death in 1897, Keneh Coker was elected chief. His
mother was a daughter of Boima Jah who had married into the Coker family. Keneh Coker
had a long rule until 1942, and, at least in 1912, received a stipend from the government of ten
pounds a year.49
The creation of a family through marriage is common across chiefdoms. This occurrence
was particularly common when the first chief had no sons old enough to become chief. In these
cases, new families are created when his daughters were married into other families, and their
husbands stood for election. It took some time, however, for these new families to be viewed
as legitimate. As with the Sellus, files from the District Commissioner in 1906 list Coker as
“regent”, and not paramount chief, indicating that even 9 years after signing Idriss’s death, he
was viewed still as a place holder for the family of Boima Jah.50 This view did not last forever,
though, as his family held the chieftaincy twice after Keneh Coker’s death.
There are of course situations in which the forbearer of a chiefdom had an abundance of
heirs, who continue to dominate the chiefdom until present day. Simbaru chiefdom, which like
Koya is also in Kenema district, is just one of these chiefdoms: though in the same region, with a
similar ethnic makeup, it only recognizes one ruling family. Oral historians trace its origin back
to a warrior and hunter named Gombulo Tama, who settled the area with his brother Jaiwu.
48Local historians memorialize his military prowess in their interpretation of the word Bagbo, which they take
to mean in Mende: “don’t be stupid while sleeping”; one must be vigilant, even while resting, of the potential for
enemy attack.
49Fourah Bay College Archives, “Information Regarding Protectorate Chiefs 1912”.
50Fourah Bay College Archives, Railway District Decree Book 1900-1904.
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Today it only has one family, which traces its origins to Tama. Tama made his settlement at
Javoima (formally called Coba town) while Jaiwa settled at Goma. Abraham (2003, p. 113)
traces the origin of Simbaru to the expansion of Keni Karteh, a warrior of the early 19th century
who, with his warriors, expanded to occupy areas surrounding his town of Dodo. Tama and
his brother were likely warriors under the command of Karteh. The first chief from this house
to be recognized by the British, Sangwewa, was a grandson of Gombulo Tama. His family
has dominated ever since, as there has always been a strong and ready male heir to take the
chieftaincy.
The organizational structure of groups of invaders during the pre-colonial period also have
affected the number of families. Take, for instance, Mambolo chiefdom in northwestern Kambia
district, which has 5 ruling families. Oral history traces the chiefdom to a woman named Borkia
who migrated from Guinea. She is likely to have come as part of the Mane invasions from
Guinea in the mid 16th century. Some time thereafter, however, her settlement was conquered
by a group of Bullom warriors. The chiefdom’s five families each trace their lineage to these
Bullom invaders.
The oral history traces the paramount chieftaincy back to a Bai Sherbora Lion in the 19th
century. The Lion house, named for the animal to commemorate the bravery of its forbearer
in battle, was the second house to hold the chieftaincy after a Bullom from an unknown family
signed a treaty with the British in 1876.51 Subsequent paramount chieftaincies have been held by
the Woni Koberr, Jum Harry, Moribaya and Somanoh houses, all of which trace their origins to
separate members of the original Bullom war party. The nature of this Bullom invasion, a loose
band of warriors from neighboring areas, resulted in many independent families being viewed
as legitimate. While in Mambolo the band of warriors led to five families, in other chiefdoms,
invading parties had only one or two leaders, which led to a smaller number of ruling families.
It is just as common for families to have successfully fought off invading tribes. Kassunko, in
northern Koinadugu district, has five recognized ruling families. The chiefdom traces its roots
to Limba warriors who conquered the Lokos in the area during the 15th century (Kup, 1962, p.
124). The Limba, however, faced another invasion by the Sofa, from present day Guinea, in the
1880s. Lipschutz (1973) records an interview with Paramount Chief Baio Serry II of Kassunko
in 1972 in which Serry recalls how his grandfather made peace with the Sofa and maintained
the independence of the chiefdom. The story is that his grandfather Sara Baio’s fingers were
gnarled. The invaders said that whenever they met a person with such a deformity, they should
not touch him, and so they did not fight. A government report from 1912 recalls that Sara Baio,
51Fourah Bay College Archives, Treaties, October 6, 1876, Scarcies.
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then an old man, “has the confidence of his people”.52
While the set of families with legitimacy to rule the chiefdoms was certainly variable in the
pre-colonial period, families have stayed incredibly resilient to change since the beginning of the
20th century. This can be seen in Mandu, of Kailahun district, where President Siaka Stevens
installed a party loyalist of the then ruling All People’s Congress Party (APC) as chief in 1983,
in order to gain political control over the area. There is only one family in this chiefdom, the
Coombers, and the installed chief was not a member. The Coombers trace their lineage to Kaba
Sei, an important chief at the turn of the 20th century and son of the original settler, Mandu
Falley. The family appears to have consolidated its legitimacy in the area at the end of the
19th century, after Kaba Sei fought against an invasion by Ndawa, a great warrior of the time
(Abraham, 2003, p. 85). In an effort to consolidate power in the area, Stevens appointed a
chief, J.B. Bunduka, who reigned until 1991 at the beginning of the war, when he was the first
paramount chief to be murdered by the Revolutionary United Front, the first rebel group of
Sierra Leone’s civil war, which had sworn to free the country from APC oppression (Smith et.
al., 2004). Undoubtedly the violence of the RUF against Bunduka was a rejection of outside
interference in the chieftaincy. Today, relatives of Bunduka are not recognized as a ruling
family.53
From this historical material, we conclude that the number of ruling families across chiefdoms
can be treated as exogenous to development and social outcomes today.
52Fourah Bay College Archives, “Information Regarding Protectorate Chiefs 1912”
53A total of seven chiefdoms had new families installed by politicians after independence: Biriwa, Neya, Kaffu
Bullom, Koya (Port Loko), Kalansogoia, Neini, Mandu. Since the war, none of these families have been viewed
as legitimate or permitted to stand in elections. We have herefore dropped these families from our count of the
number of families though including them does not change any results presented below.
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Figure 1: Map of Sierra Leone’s chiefdoms with the number of families plotted by quintiles.
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Figure 3: Effect of log number of families on literacy by five year birth cohorts. The dotted lines
give a 95% confidence interval. Specification is OLS with controls for amalgamation, number
of seats observed and district fixed effects. Cohorts born before 1953 are observed in the 1963
census, in which one chiefdom, Dibia, has missing data. Dropping this chiefdom from the 2004
data produces a similar graph. The first cohort, plotted at y=1914, actually includes anyone
born before 1918.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
By quartiles of
number of ruling families
Number of (1) (2) (3) (4)
observations
A. Chieftaincy Variables and Controls
Number of seats observed 5.8 149 6.3 5.7 5.8 5.2
(2.6)
Amalgamation 0.3 149 0.02 0.30 0.45 0.72
Herfindahl 0.54 149 0.72 0.52 0.40 0.42
(0.24)
Maximum seats for family with 3.5 149 4.6 3.1 3.0 2.6
most seats (1.7)




Literacy rate 0.32 2,727,622 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33
(chiefdom of birth)
Primary school attainment 0.35 2,717,412 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.36
(chiefdom of birth)
Secondary school attainment 0.16 2,193,151 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17
(chiefdom of birth)
Non-agricultural employment 0.13 2,919,953 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.16
(chiefdom of birth)
Non-agricultural employment 0.07 2,406,191 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.10
(chiefdom of residence)
NPS
Mobile phone ownership 0.18 5,160 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.24
(chiefdom of birth)
Mobile phone ownership 0.08 4,473 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.11
(chiefdom of residence)
Has tile or cement floor 0.26 5,167 0.19 0.27 0.21 0.35
(chiefdom of birth)
Has tile or cement floor 0.14 4,497 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.19
(chiefdom of residence)
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
By quartiles of
number of ruling families
Number of (1) (2) (3) (4)
observations
DHS (Health outcomes for children under five)
Weight for height Z-score -0.15 1,521 -0.14 -0.14 0.05 -0.27
(1.60)
Body mass index Z-score -0.014 1,521 -0.020 -0.004 0.22 -0.16
(1.66)
Anemia 0.50 1,423 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.47
C. Attitudes
Agrees one should respect authority 0.45 4,497 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.42
Agrees only older people can lead 0.31 4,497 0.31 0.30 0.35 0.29
D. Social Capital
Attended community meeting 0.43 4,438 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.39
in last year
Attended local council meeting 0.22 4,462 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19
Attended meeting with 0.39 4,424 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.34
Paramount Chief
School committee member 0.22 4,464 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.21
Labor gang member 0.25 4,467 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.23
Secret society member 0.37 4,457 0.44 0.35 0.30 0.36
Participated in road brushing 0.40 4,464 0.47 0.41 0.40 0.31
in last month
E. Covariates of Economic Development in 1900
Hut tax assessment 0.85 87 0.94 0.89 0.54 0.87
(£per km2 ) (1.17)
Hut tax assessment 0.016 87 0.020 0.016 0.008 0.016
(£per capita in 2004 ) (0.019)
Distance to coast (km) 105 149 120 105 92 91
(66)
Distance to river (km) 9 149 12 8 8 9
(7)
Distance to rail (km) 45 149 44 46 45 38
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
By quartiles of
number of ruling families
Number of (1) (2) (3) (4)
observations
(30)
Minimum distance to Bo, 79 149 81 79 79 78
Freetown or Kenema (km) (44)
F. Individual Level Covariates
Census
Age 23 3,548,867 23 23 23 23
(20)
Female 0.52 3,549,147 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53
Limba 0.07 3,549,037 0.7 0.09 0.05 0.06
Mende 0.36 3,549,037 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.17
Temne 0.30 3,549,037 0.10 0.26 0.31 0.63
NPS
Paramount or section chief 0.09 4,497 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08
Headman in household 0.18 4,475 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.13
Membership in ruling family 0.30 4,219 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.28
Notes: Standard deviations presented in parenthesis; no standard deviation reported for binary
variables.
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Table 2: Concentration of power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Herfhindahl power concentration index
# families -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(# families) -0.25 -0.31 -0.28 -0.28
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.20 0.33 0.50 0.51 0.33 0.47 0.59 0.60
F 28.12 81.24
B. Number of seats held by family with most seats
# families -0.32 -0.35 -0.30 -0.35
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
ln(# families) -1.39 -1.66 -1.44 -1.60
(0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23)
R2 0.16 0.55 0.67 0.69 0.20 0.62 0.71 0.73
F 30.11 40.98
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
Study Controls NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
District FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Researcher FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Study controls are the number of
chieftaincy seats recalled for the chiefdom, and a dummy for whether the chiefdom
is an amalgamation chiefdom.
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Table 3: Tests for exogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Tax per Tax per Tax per Tax per Distance to Distance to Distance to Min. distance to
variable km2 km2 capita (2004) capita (2004) coast (km) river(km) rail (km) 3 largest towns(km)
# families -0.008 -0.04 -0.0003 0.0002 -5.0 -0.36 -0.58 0.03
(0.035) (0.04) (0.0008) (0.0009) (2.1) (0.28) (1.17) (1.54)
R2 0.00 0.28 0.002 0.41 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
ln(# families) -0.005 -0.13 -0.001 0.0006 - 20.1 -1.5 -3.1 0.13
(0.155) (0.16) (0.004) (0.004) (9.8) (1.1) (4.7) (6.03)
R2 0.00 0.28 0.002 0.41 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Number of observations 87 87 87 87 149 149 149 149
District fixed effects NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Educational outcomes, results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Literacy Primary school attainment Secondary school attainment
Source Census Census Census Census NPS Census Census NPS
ln(# families) 0.051 0.046 0.055 0.048 0.054 0.038 0.036 0.044
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.024) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020)
R2 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.10
Observations 2,623,140 2,622,861 2,613,249 2,612,970 5,041 2,082,645 2,082,366 5,041
Chiefdoms 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES
Notes: Individuals are matched to chiefdoms based on chiefdom of birth; Similar, in fact stronger, results obtain
when matching on chiefdom of current residence. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the chiefdom level. Dependent variables are dummy variables ∈ {0, 1} indicating an individual’s literacy, primary
school attainment or secondary school attainment accordingly. For literacy and primary school attainment, all
individuals above the age of 12 are included; for secondary school attainment all individuals above the age of
18. Individuals in the NPS sample are all household heads. Demographic controls include, age, age squared, and
gender and ethnicity dummies. All specifications include 12 district fixed effects, the number of chieftaincy seats
observed, and a dummy for whether the chiefdom is an amalgamation chiefdom.
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Table 5: Health outcomes for children under five, results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Weight for height Body mass index Anemia
variable Z-score Z-score
ln(# families) 0.212 0.211 0.189 0.185 -0.099 -0.091
(0.117) (0.117) (0.123) (0.124) (0.041) (0.040)
R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
Number of observations 1,521 1,519 1,521 1,519 1,423 1,421
Number of Chiefdoms 116 116 116 116 114 114
District Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mother Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Births are matched to chiefdom on current residence of the mother; chiefdom
of birth is unavailable in the data set. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered at the chiefdom level. Z-scores calculated using the World Health
Organization Child Growth Standards (2006). Anemia is a dummy variable ∈ {0, 1}
indicating anemia was detected in a hemoglobin test. Children are matched to chief-
doms on chiefdom of current residence. Mother controls include ethnicity dummies,
age and age squared. All specifications include 12 district fixed effects, number of
seats and an amalgamation dummy.
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Table 6: Economic outcomes, results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Non-agricultural Household mobile Household has
employment phone ownership cement or tile floor
Chiefdom match Birth Residence Birth Residence Birth Residence
ln(# families) 0.016 0.022 0.068 0.038 0.078 0.040
(0.008) (0.011) (0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)
R2 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03
Observations 2,790,000 2,288,874 5,071 4,385 5,077 4,391
Chiefdoms 149 149 149 149 149 149
District Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the chiefdom
level. Dependent variables for employment, phone ownership and floor quality are all
dummy variables ∈ {0, 1}. Employment is observed in the census and asset ownership
is observed in the NPS. Similar, though insignificant results for assets obtain matching
on chiefdom of current residence in the DHS, which covers only 117 of 149 chiefdoms.
Specifications for non-agricultural employment include all individuals above the age of 10.
Demographic controls controls include gender, age, age squared, and ethnicity dummies.
All specifications include 12 district fixed effects, the number of chieftaincy seats observed,
and a dummy for whether the chiefdom is an amalgamation chiefdom.
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Table 7: Effects on literacy by birth cohort
Birth Cohort Pre 1918 1919-1923 1924-1928 1929-1933 1934-1938 1939-1943 1944-1948
ln(# families) 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.015
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
R2 0.29 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.41
Number of observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Birth Cohort 1949-1953 1954-1958 1959-1963 1964-1968 1969-1973 1974-1978 1979-1983
ln(# families) 0.031 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.044 0.044 0.052
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
R2 0.45 0.36 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.37
Number of observations 148 149 149 149 149 149 149
Notes: The table presents coefficients in the OLS regression of the chiefdom literacy rate among five-year
birth cohorts on the log number of families, controls for amalgamation, number of seats observed and district
fixed effects. Individuals are matched on chiefdom of current residence; chiefdom of birth is not available
in the 1963 census. Robust standard error in parenthesis. Cohorts born before 1953 are observed in the
1963 census, in which one chiefdom, Dibia, has missing data. Dropping this chiefdom from the 2004 data
produces nearly identical results. Only chiefdom level aggregates were available in the 1963 census. For
continuity, we present results for cohorts observed in the 2004 census using aggregates as well. Identical
results obtain using the micro data for later cohorts.
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Table 8: Attitudes, results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Agree one should Agree only older
variable respect authority people can lead
ln(# families) -0.088 -0.080 -0.038 -0.035
(0.038) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07
Number of observations 4,497 4,391 4,497 4,391
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls NO YES NO YES
Notes: Individuals are matched on chiefdom of current residence;
similar, in fact stronger, results obtain matching on chiefdom of
birth. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clus-
tered at the chiefdom level. Demographic controls are gender and
ethnicity dummies, age and age squared. All specifications include
12 district fixed effects, number of seats and an amalgamation
dummy.
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Table 9: Social capital activities, correlation coefficients
Attended Attended Attended School Labor Secret Participated
community local council meeting with committee gang society in road
meeting meeting chief member member member brushing
Panel A: Individual level correlations of activities
Attended community meeting 1.00
Attended local council meeting 0.27 1.00
Attended meeting with chief 0.28 0.39 1.00
School committee member 0.22 0.16 0.17 1.00
Labor gang member 0.23 0.10 0.12 0.06 1.00
Secret society member 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.14 1.00
Participated in road brushing 0.34 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.07 1.00
Panel B: Chiefdom level correlations of aggregate shares
Primary school attainment (Census) -0.14 0.04 -0.19 -0.05 -0.36 0.21 0.01
Non-agricultural employment (Census) -0.22 -0.16 -0.25 -0.03 -0.30 0.05 -0.20
Owns cement or tile floor (NPS) -0.06 0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.21 -0.01 -0.05
Owns mobile phone (NPS) -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.12 -0.29 0.05 -0.10
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Table 10: Social capital activities, results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Bridging B. Bonding C. Collective
action
Dependent Attended Attended Attended School Labor Secret Participated
variable community local council meeting with committee gang society in road
meeting meeting chief member member member brushing
ln(# families) -0.086 -0.068 -0.045 -0.036 -0.073 -0.065 -0.075
(0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.023) (0.033) (0.035)
R2 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.15
Number of observations 4,314 4,336 4,299 4,337 4,340 4,330 4,338
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Individuals are matched on chiefdom of current residence; similar, in fact stronger, results obtain match-
ing on chiefdom of birth. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the chiefdom level.
Dependent variables are all dummies. All specifications include 12 district fixed effects, demographic controls as
in the attitudes specifications (gender and ethnicity dummies, age and age squared), the number of chieftaincy
seats observed, and a dummy for whether the chiefdom is an amalgamation chiefdom.
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Table 11: Robustness check including connections to chieftaincy elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Primary Mobile Cement or Agree one Attended Secret Participated
school phone tile floor should respect community society in road
attainment ownership ownership authority meeting member brushing
ln(# families) 0.055 0.067 0.083 -0.080 -0.085 -0.071 -0.076
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.040) (0.024) (0.035) (0.033)
Paramount or section 0.012 0.048 0.072 0.023 0.141 -0.039 0.065
chief in household (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
Ruling family 0.029 0.029 0.034 -0.012 0.051 0.047 0.068
member (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Village headman -0.062 -0.095 -0.134 0.010 0.068 0.061 0.027
in household (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
R2 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.17
Observations 4,770 4,797 4,803 4,128 4,092 4,108 4,111
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: For primary school attainment, mobile phone ownership and cement or tile floor ownership, individuals
are matched on chiefdom of birth, as in previous specifications; results are very similar matching on chiefdom of
current residence. For other variables, individuals are matched on chiefdom of current residence. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the chiefdom level. Each specification includes number of seats
and an amalgamation dummy, and demographic controls for age, age squared, sex and ethnicity dummies.
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Table 12: Robustness check, connections to the elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Member of Paramount or Headman in
variable ruling family section chief household
in household
ln(# families) -0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.018 -0.033 -0.018
(0.028) (0.027) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018)
R2 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.24 0.05 0.13
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147
District fixed effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Dependent variables are chiefdom shares observed in the NPS. Stan-
dard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Two chiefdoms are missing at
random due to the NPS sampling strategy. Each specification includes num-
ber of seats and an amalgamation dummy.
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Table 13: Robustness check, effects of linkages to elite by log number of families
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Primary Secondary Mobile Has tile
variable school school phone or cement
attainment attainment ownership floor
Paramount or section chief in household 0.007 0.036 0.026 0.090
(0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.049)
Paramount or section chief in household × -0.001 -0.017 0.011 -0.022
ln(# families) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.037)
Number of observations 4,353 4,353 4,381 4,387
R2 0.169 0.143 0.128 0.115
Ruling family member 0.058 0.049 0.069 0.047
(0.039) (0.033) (0.026) (0.034)
Ruling family member × -0.032 -0.021 -0.017 0.003
ln(# families) (0.029) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022)
Number of observations 4,103 4,103 4,128 4,134
R2 0.174 0.148 0.133 0.121
Headman in household 0.036 0.054 0.050 0.032
(0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030)
Headman in household × -0.039 -0.039 -0.033 -0.024
ln(# families) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024)
Number of observations 4,349 4,349 4,377 4,383
R2 0.170 0.144 0.127 0.112
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES
Chiefdom Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the chiefdom level.
Dependent variables are all dummies. All specifications include 12 district fixed effects, demo-
graphic controls as in the attitudes specifications (gender and ethnicity dummies, age and age
squared), the number of chieftaincy seats observed, and a dummy for whether the chiefdom is
an amalgamation chiefdom.
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Appendix Table 1: Chieftaincy Data
District Chiefdom Herfindahl Number of Amalgam- Number of
families ation seats
Bo Badjia 0.56 2 0 6
Bagbo 0.39 4 0 6
Bagbwe 0.63 4 0 4
Baoma 0.51 2 0 7
Bumpe Ngao 0.33 5 0 3
Gbo 0.50 3 0 6
Jaiama Bongor 1.00 7 1 1
Kakua 0.28 7 0 9
Komboya 0.39 3 0 7
Lugbu 0.72 2 0 6
Niawa Lenga 0.38 5 0 4
Selenga 0.51 2 0 7
Tikonko 0.33 4 0 3
Valunia 0.33 5 1 6
Wonde 0.35 3 0 7
Bombali Biriwa 0.50 3 0 6
Bombali Sebora 0.28 4 1 10
Gbanti Kamaranka 0.38 5 1 4
Gbendembu Ngowahun 1.00 4 1 1
Libeisaygahun 0.52 5 1 5
Magbaimba Ndorhahun 0.47 5 1 8
Makari Gbanti 0.50 8 1 2
Paki Masabong 0.33 7 1 3
Safroko Limba 1.00 2 0 4
Sanda Loko 0.26 5 0 10
Sanda Tendaran 0.59 3 0 7
Sella Limba 0.28 4 0 8
Tambakha 0.56 9 1 3
Bonthe Bendu-Cha 0.33 5 1 3
Bum 0.43 3 0 7
Dema 0.50 2 0 4
Imperri 0.50 2 0 4
Jong 0.39 3 0 6
Kpanda Kemo 0.39 3 1 7
Kwamebai Krim 0.50 4 1 4
Nongoba 0.50 3 0 4
Sittia 0.63 3 0 4
Sogbeni 0.56 2 0 6
Yawbeko 0.25 4 1 4
Kailahun Dea 1.00 2 0 5
Jawie 0.51 2 0 7
Kissi Kama 0.56 2 0 6
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Appendix Table 1: Chieftaincy Data
District Chiefdom Herfindahl Number of Amalgam- Number of
families ation seats
Kissi Teng 0.51 2 0 7
Kissi Tongi 0.28 4 0 8
Kpeje Bongre 0.56 7 1 3
Kpeje West 1.00 1 0 5
Luawa 0.43 3 0 9
Malema 0.56 3 0 3
Mandu 1.00 1 0 5
Njaluahun 0.43 5 0 7
Penguia 0.65 3 0 9
Upper Bambara 0.33 4 0 9
Yawei 0.25 4 0 8
Kambia Bramaia 0.38 5 1 4
Gbinle Dixin 0.25 9 1 4
Mabolo 0.22 5 0 6
Magbema 0.23 5 0 9
Masungbala 0.34 8 1 8
Samu 0.32 4 0 11
Tonko Limba 0.27 4 0 11
Kenema Dama 0.31 4 0 9
Dodo 0.59 2 0 7
Gaura 0.25 5 0 8
Gorama Mende 0.72 2 0 6
Kandu Leppiama 0.56 5 1 3
Koya 0.47 3 0 8
Langrama 0.63 2 0 4
Lower Bambara 0.50 2 0 10
Malegohun 0.50 9 1 4
Niawa 0.44 5 0 5
Nomo 0.63 2 0 4
Nongowa 0.31 4 0 9
Simbaru 1.00 1 0 6
Small Bo 0.51 3 0 9
Tunkia 1.00 3 0 3
Wandor 0.44 3 0 5
Koinadugu Diang 0.52 2 0 5
Folosaba Dembelia 1.00 4 1 5
Kasunko 0.52 5 1 5
Mongo 0.39 6 1 6
Neya 0.56 4 1 3
Nieni 0.50 5 1 2
Sengbe 1.00 3 1 3
Sinkunia 0.80 2 0 9
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Appendix Table 1: Chieftaincy Data
District Chiefdom Herfindahl Number of Amalgam- Number of
families ation seats
Sulima 1.00 4 1 2
Wara Wara Bafodia 0.50 7 1 6
Wara Wara Yagala 0.50 2 0 6
Kono Fiama 0.39 3 0 6
Gbane 0.59 2 0 7
Gbane Kandor 1.00 1 0 5
Gbense 0.55 4 0 7
Gorama Kono 0.50 2 0 4
Kamara 0.38 4 0 4
Lei 1.00 1 0 4
Mafindor 0.72 2 0 6
Nimikoro 0.50 2 0 4
Nimiyama 1.00 3 0 3
Sandor 1.00 1 0 5
Soa 0.59 2 0 7
Tankoro 0.39 3 0 6
Toli 1.00 2 0 5
Moyamba Bahruwa 0.38 4 1 4
Bumpeh 1.00 2 0 10
Dasse 1.00 2 0 4
Fakunya 0.56 4 1 3
Kagboro 1.00 2 0 17
Kaiyamba 0.28 6 0 8
Kamajei 0.33 8 1 3
Kongboa 0.58 2 0 10
Kori 0.56 4 0 6
Kowa 0.30 6 0 10
Lower Banta (Gbangbatoke) 0.72 5 0 6
Ribbi 0.78 2 0 8
Timdale 0.52 2 0 5
Upper Banta (Mokele) 1.00 3 0 5
Port Loko Bureh Kasseh Makonteh 0.56 12 1 3
Buya 0.56 9 1 3
Dibia 0.31 4 0 7
Kaffu Bullom 0.20 6 0 10
Koya 0.20 6 0 10
Lokomasama 0.41 3 0 9
Maforki 0.52 11 1 5
Marampa 0.28 6 0 6
Masimera 0.28 4 0 6
Sanda Magbolontor 0.41 4 0 8
Tinkatupa Maka Saffroko 0.28 7 1 5
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Appendix Table 1: Chieftaincy Data
District Chiefdom Herfindahl Number of Amalgam- Number of
families ation seats
Pujehun Barri 0.26 9 0 10
Galliness Perri 1.00 3 1 1
Kpaka 1.00 1 0 8
Makpele 0.53 5 0 8
Malen 0.63 4 0 4
Mono Sakrim 1.00 1 0 7
Panga Kabonde 0.56 5 1 3
Panga Krim 0.56 2 0 6
Pejeh (Futa Pejeh) 0.33 5 0 9
Soro Gbema 0.33 4 1 3
Sowa 1.00 1 0 5
Yakemu Kpukumu Krim 0.56 3 1 3
Tonkolili Gbonkolenken 0.56 4 1 3
Kafe Simiria 1.00 3 1 1
Kalansogoia 0.56 2 1 3
Kholifa Mabang 0.24 5 0 10
Kholifa Rowala 0.56 8 1 3
Kunike 0.38 3 1 4
Kunike Barina 0.36 4 0 5
Malal Mara 0.50 8 1 2
Sambaya 0.80 2 0 9
Tane 0.33 4 0 9
Yoni 0.38 8 1 4
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